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The Sanctifying Work of the Holy Spirit
in Christian Virtue Formation
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6.1 Introduction

Pursuing a life of increasing virtue is a difficult task. "Such a life," a life of virtue and contemplation, says Aristotle, "would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him." It is a fundamental Christian doctrine that the life of virtue formation or what Christians have called "sanctification" involves the activity of God. For instance, Augustine writes, "For our good, about which philosophers have so keenly contended, is nothing else than to be united to God. It is, if I may say so, by spiritually embracing Him that the intellectual soul is filled and impregnated with true virtues." But what does "spiritually embracing Him" amount to and how does that embrace bring about true virtue? While there is consensus within the Christian theological tradition that virtue of some sort or another is available outside the spiritual embrace of God, it is also maintained that such an embrace is a significant part of the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying work. And yet, there are divergent accounts regarding how the Holy Spirit brings about such transformation. For instance, one account has it that the sanctifying operation of the Holy Spirit is essentially mysterious and therefore unknown. And yet, various biblical passages suggest a sanctifying process that can be positively understood, at least in part, and thereby meaningfully engaged. Indeed, the manner in which believers engage the means of sanctifying grace is framed by their understanding of how the Spirit of

1 Nicomachean Ethics, 10.7 (Aristotle 1984).
2 City of God, 10.3 (Augustine 2015).
3 See e.g., Kärkkäinen 2012.
4 Kuyper 1904.
5 For instance, in Galatians 5:16–25 Paul describes at least a two-stage sanctification process of walking in the Spirit that leads to not gratifying desires to sin (v. 16). And yet, Paul goes on to draw attention to a conflict between the "desires of the Spirit" and the "desires of the flesh" that "keep you from doing the things you want to do" (v. 17). Nevertheless, the Galatians are encouraged to be "led by the Spirit" (v. 18) and "keep in step with the Spirit" (v. 25) now that they have "life in the Spirit" (v. 25), which will bring about the "fruit of the Spirit" (vs. 22–3). While the interconnection of these features of sanctification are not explicitly formulated in this passage, the passage is suggestive of a growth process that can at least be partly understood (e.g., conflicting desires) and thereby meaningfully engaged (e.g.,

God utilizes those means in sanctification. For example, if the process of the Spirit’s sanctifying work is, in fact, mysterious, then it will be a mystery as to how engaging Scripture, prayer, and other means of grace interact with the Spirit’s formational work. In this way, coming to a view of the nature of the Spirit’s transforming work frames and orients the intentionality involved in the spiritual practices that constitute a life of Christian virtue formation.

In a foundational paper, William Alston (1988) helpfully distinguishes three models of the sanctifying work of the Spirit. First, according to what Alston calls the “fiat model,” characterological changes are achieved directly by the omnipotent will of the Holy Spirit independent of human activity. Second, according to the “interpersonal model,” characterological changes are brought about through the person’s receptivity to the Spirit’s relational, interpersonal presence. Third, on what Alston terms the “sharing model,” characterological changes in a person are brought about through a metaphysical participation of the divine life within the person. Alston finds weaknesses with both the fiat and interpersonal models that he argues are avoided by adopting the sharing model. In this chapter, we contend for a reconsideration of the interpersonal model by offering a more developed account of interpersonal relationality that avoids Alston’s critiques and takes on board what he sees as the theological and psychological benefits of the sharing model. We conclude with a discussion of the practical significance for Christian virtue formation of coming to have a more accurate understanding of the Spirit’s sanctifying work.

6.1.1 Alston’s Approach

Alston focuses his discussion on the specific activity of the Holy Spirit that brings about characterological change—i.e., those psychological alterations that transform the Christian into greater conformity to the virtuous image of Christ. These changes occur in what Alston calls a “motivational structure,” including “changes in one’s tendencies, desires, values, attitudes, emotional proclivities, and the like.” For example, “the weakening of a desire for illicit sexual intercourse, the strengthening of a desire for awareness of God, the weakening of a tendency to be preoccupied with one’s status or reputation, and the strengthening of one’s interest in the condition of others.”

Alston’s focus is therefore limited to the moral aspects of the work of the Holy Spirit and not to other effects the Spirit of God may bring about (e.g., physical healing, spiritual gifts, illumination). Furthermore, Alston rules out such extreme

* Alston 1988, 126.
views as ultra-Pelagianism in which natural human capacities alone are responsible for moral change and ultra-Augustinianism in which God literally takes over as the primary agent in a person’s life. Alston rightly maintains that these views substantially depart, each in its own way, from “scripture, tradition, and normal Christian experience.” He concludes that “any viable answer” to the question of the nature of the Spirit’s transforming work “must recognize both a divine and a human agent, both divine activity and human response.”

6.2 The Fiat Model

With those preliminaries in place, Alston first considers the fiat model, according to which psychological changes in a person are brought about directly by the omnipotent will of the Holy Spirit independent of a person’s active participation with the Spirit. On this view, the activity of the Holy Spirit in sanctification constitutes the same type of activity as the act of creation. As Alston explains, “God just decides that one of my tendencies shall be weakened and another strengthened, and Presto! It is done.” The believer passively experiences the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit and contributes nothing to the Spirit’s work.

In evaluation of the fiat model, Alston first observes that various biblical passages can be naturally read as indicating that sanctification occurs by a direct operation of God’s power independent of human response or participation. For instance, 1 Thessalonians 5:23 reads, “May God himself, the God of peace, make you holy in every part, and keep you sound in spirit, soul, and body, without fault when our Lord Jesus Christ comes” (Alston further references Psalms 51:10; Ezekiel 11:19–20; Philippians 2:12–13; and 1 Thessalonians 3:12). Moreover, Alston notes that a variety of theologians defend what appear to be fiat models of sanctification (e.g., Augustus Strong and Emil Brunner) and that the model fits well with the New Testament motif of “new creation”/“new birth” in that just as persons play no active part in being created by God or born as infants, they play no active role in their new creation or spiritual rebirth. Further, the view captures a central aspect of the phenomenological reports of a wide variety of Christians throughout Church history in which dramatic change seems to the person in question as “a bolt from the blue,” straight from God alone.

While Alston admits that God could sanctify individuals according to divine fiat and that God may do so on some occasions, he has reasons for doubting that fiat-change is God’s “normal modus operandi.” First, Alston notes that a major theme of the Christian tradition is that God made us for loving, interpersonal interaction with himself and that the fiat model is distinctively impersonal.

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7 Ibid., 125. 8 Ibid.; cf., Adams 2016, 84. 9 Alston 1988, 126. 10 Ibid., 130. 11 Ibid., 130.
“treat us as sticks and stones, or at least acting in a way that is indistinguishable from one that is equally appropriate to sticks and stones.”12 Second, Alston worries that for God to alter another’s desires and attitudes without the other’s consent would be a violation of the other’s personal integrity.13 Third, a striking problem with the fiat model is how to explain the gradual nature of sanctification (e.g., 2 Corinthians 4:16; Galatians 4:19). Alston observes that the fiat model raises concerns over why transformation is incomplete and stretched over an extended period.14 The classic Christian response of “the world, the flesh, and the devil” as obstacles to spiritual transformation would provide little explanatory force given that on the fiat model these obstacles to growth only remain until God chooses to override their negative influence. Thus, on this account there is no available explanation for the slowness of spiritual change apart from God’s apparent unwillingness to sanctify his beloved children, which seems inconsistent with God’s goodness as well as his desire to bring about human moral transformation (e.g., Leviticus 20:26; 1 Peter 1:16).

For these reasons, Alston considers a second model more in keeping with the personal nature of God and humans. Alston writes:

Would it not be more appropriate to our God-given nature and to God’s intentions for us for God to go about our transformation in a way that is distinctively appropriate to persons, a way that would involve calling us to repentance, chastising us for our failures, encouraging and assisting us to get started and persevere in the way, making new resources available to us, enlivening and energizing us, assuring us with his love, his providence, and his constant presence with us, leaving it up to us whether the desired response is forthcoming.15

Before moving to Alston’s consideration of the interpersonal model, we offer three additional liabilities of the fiat model. First, the fiat model offers no explanation of the various passages of Scripture that condition growth on human participation. For instance, Paul’s imperative to “walk in the Spirit” apparently results in “and you will not gratify the desires of the flesh” (Galatians 5:17). The Second Letter of Peter exhorts its audience to “make every effort to supplement your faith with virtue, and virtue with knowledge, and knowledge with self-control…” (2 Peter 1:5–6; cf., 7–10). Passages such as these make it clear that Christian growth involves human participation of some sort. While it could be that God sanctifies by fiat, but nevertheless conditions that work on human efforts (e.g., prayer, receiving the Eucharist, scripture meditation), human involvement on such a view would be fictitious and arbitrary. It would have no meaningful connection to the transforming work of God. God could just as well ask humans to jump on one foot as a

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12 Ibid., 131.  
13 Ibid., 131.  
14 Ibid., 153.  
15 Ibid., 131.
condition of his directly bringing about the fruit of the Spirit. Second, the fiat model does not provide any rationale for the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit. Certainly, God could change human personality by his omnipotent will without personally inhabiting the human personality, and so there is no theological rationale on this view for the indwelling ministry of the Spirit of God. What is the point of Jesus not leaving us as orphans and, instead, sending the Spirit to guide us into truth if transformation occurs independently of that reality (cf., John 15:27)? Lastly, some biblical statements appear to directly contradict sanctification by fiat. For instance, Jesus tells his disciples to go and “make disciples . . . and teach them to do all that I have commanded” (Matthew 28:20). Teaching someone to keep the commands of Jesus appears inconsistent with sanctification by fiat.

So, on the basis of Alston’s initial reasons to reject the fiat model, as well as our additional objections, the fiat model understood as a comprehensive model of the role of the Holy Spirit in sanctification appears false.

6.3 The Interpersonal Model

Alston next considers the interpersonal model. On this model, psychological changes in a person are brought about through the person’s receptivity to the Spirit’s personal influence. Alston explains that there are interpersonal activities that the Spirit could utilize to influence the believer towards holiness “without stepping in and directly producing such a character structure by fiat.”

First, God can call the individual to voluntary repentance, obedience, and life in the Spirit. These divine communications, even when not voluntarily responded to, can have effects on an individual’s likes, desires, and attitudes. Second, God could affect the “ideational processes” of the believer by bringing “it about that facets of the person’s present life appear to him in an unfavorable light, and the life of agape appears to him as highly attractive” even though the individual is not conscious of this being a communication from God.

Third, God could present himself to the individual as a “role model” by making his “love and providence for the individual more obvious, more salient in the person’s mind, thereby evoking responses of gratitude and yearning for closer communion.”

And fourth, God could make “new resources” available: “new resources of strength of will, of energy for perseverance in the face of discouragement, of inner strength that enable one to avoid dependence on the approval of one’s associates.” In these ways God would be using his extraordinary personal powers to influence human persons qua persons “seeking to evoke responses, voluntary and otherwise from the other person, somewhat as each of us seeks to evoke responses from each other.”

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While Alston believes that the interpersonal model more adequately fits the personal nature of God and humans than the fiat model, that various biblical texts utilize this sort of terminology (e.g., John 14:23, 14:26, 15:27), and that the model coheres fairly well with the "phenomenology of sanctification," he nevertheless thinks there is an inadequacy with the interpersonal model that pushes the discussion in favor of the sharing model.21 The inadequacy, Alston maintains, is that there is a disanalogy between the externality involved in interpersonal relationships and the special mode of internality involved in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In her engagement with Alston’s view, Marilyn McCord Adams has referred to this as the "internality problem."22 Of this problem, Alston writes:

The distinctive thrust of the interpersonal model lies in its construal of the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit on the analogy of moral influence one human being can exert on another, by speech, by provision of a role model, and by emotional bonds. But all this leaves the parties involved external to each other in a fundamental way; they are separate, distinct persons, each with his or her own autonomy and integrity.23 Alston recognizes that at times we use interpersonal language that evokes the internality of the other, such as, “I carry some of you around with me wherever I go.”24 Alston thinks this sort of language is figurative while the indwelling of the Holy Spirit needs to be taken literally. If Alston is right about this disanalogy, then the interpersonal model comes up short due to the internality problem.

6.4 The Sharing Model

The internality problem motivates Alston’s preferred view, the sharing model. According to this view, psychological changes in a person are brought about through a literal merging or sharing of the divine life with the person’s life. It is in partaking of and participating in the divine nature—not the mere external moral influence of God—that the believer is sanctified (2 Peter 1:4; see also 1 Corinthians 1:9). Again, Alston:

To my mind, all the talk of being filled, permeated, pervaded by the Spirit, of the Spirit’s being poured out into our hearts strongly suggests that there is a literal merging or mutual interpenetration of the life of the individual and the divine life, a breaking down of the barriers that normally separate one life from another.25

21 Ibid., 131, 133. 22 Adams 2016, 83. 23 Alston 1988, 137. 24 Ibid., 137. 25 Ibid., 141.
Being filled with the Spirit is, Alston asserts, “like being plugged into a source of electricity, or being permeated by a fog, or, closer to the etymology, being inflated by air pressure, or being filled with a liquid.” Alston recognizes that these material analogies are too impersonal and that the believer is, after all, in a personal relationship with the Spirit. Nevertheless, Alston writes:

the wide consensus on the appropriateness of this language of filling and permeating indicates that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is of a fundamentally different character from the relationship of two human persons, however intimate, different by reason of being much more an internal matter.

It is important to note here that Alston’s sharing model includes an interpersonal dimension; it is just that the sort of interpersonal relationship between believers and the Spirit is importantly disanalogous with that between two human persons in virtue of its being uniquely internal: “We realize in our life and, to some extent, in our consciousness, the very life of God himself.” Alston’s introduction of this disanalogous internality of the very life of God within the human person resolves the internality problem but at the cost of introducing a mechanism of formation that itself requires explanation.

In an effort to explain how the internality of God’s life brings about character-formation, Alston has us imagine that two persons are connected by a “neural wiring hookup” such that a person’s, say Sasha’s, reactions, feelings, thoughts, and attitudes are as immediately available to another person, Mary, as Mary’s own reactions, feelings, thoughts, and attitudes and hence Sasha’s mental life influences Mary’s thinking, feeling, and behavior in the same way as Mary’s mental life influences Mary’s thinking, feeling, and behavior. Likewise, the same is true of Sasha with respect to Mary’s mental life. Consequently, Sasha’s mental life will be influenced by access to Mary’s mental life, and Mary’s mental life will be influenced by access to Sasha’s mental life. Sasha and Mary share each other’s lives. The gist of the idea is that the believer’s sharing in the divine life amounts to the believer having first-person access, both consciously and unconsciously, to the life of God: his affections, desires, attitudes, values, dispositions, and so on.

With this account of human sharing in God’s mental life in place, Alston develops two pictures of how such participation would bring about characterological change: a cognitive picture and a conative one. The cognitive picture is that in sharing the divine life believers are immediately aware of, for instance, God’s

26 Ibid., 138. 27 Ibid., 138. 28 Ibid., 139. 29 For Alston’s other attempts to fill out the notion of life-sharing, see 1988, 142–3; cf., Adams 2016, 89–91. It is worth noting that Alston’s analogies do not depict a literal indwelling of one person in another nor of one person’s life in another. Instead, they depict the direct givenness of the mental states of a person who is external to another person.
loving tendencies toward others in a “maximally direct and vivid fashion.” This would provide a sense of what it is like to love others as God loves them, and persons could then make choices to engage in the requisite psychological processes to bring about the same sort of loving tendencies for others as God has. Alternatively, the conative picture of life-sharing is that God introduces into human motivational structures fragile tendencies for good (e.g., to love others). These tendencies leave room for the believer’s own agency to either build them up or refuse to do so. Combining these two pictures, in sharing the divine life persons come to have an immediate, cognitive awareness of God’s tendencies to desire, feel, and act for the good as well as their own divinely implanted tendencies to desire, feel, and act for the good. Believers indwelt by the Spirit are then in the position to build (or not) upon these implanted tendencies with a keen, guiding awareness of God’s tendencies.

Alston sums up the advantages of the sharing model as follows. First, the sharing model “makes an important place in sanctification for human response and human effort, while at the same time recognizing the divine initiative as absolutely critical.” Second, it recognizes “a mode of internality that goes beyond any interpersonal intimacy.” Third, it offers an explanation of how such internality can bring about change. Fourth, it reveals the goal of sanctification to be full communion with God—“the fullest possible sharing in the divine nature”—and not just moral improvement. Finally, the sharing model offers a satisfactory account of initial, soteriological regeneration, understood both as a decisive divine act that “fundamentally transforms the human condition” and “as something that in itself leaves the individual with a lot of work to do.”

6.5 The Sharing Model Reconsidered

We find Alston’s paper an excellent example of the sort of careful analysis needed in discussing the nature of sanctification, and we are deeply indebted to his work. Indeed, we agree with Alston’s denial of the fiat model in favor of the interpersonal model. We equally agree with his shift from an interpersonal model, understood as external moral influence between two persons, toward a model of sanctification that does justice to both the internality of the indwelling Spirit as well as the biblical language of permeation/filling by the Spirit. Having said that, we believe Alston too quickly abandoned an interpersonal framework in favor of a shared-life framework. For one, the sharing model seems to fail at some of the very points Alston claims it succeeds. Second, a reworking of the interpersonal model avoids these difficulties and can take on board Alston’s rightful emphasis on internality.

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30 Alston 1988, 145. 31 Ibid., 146. 32 Ibid., 147. 33 Ibid., 147. 34 Ibid., 147. 35 Ibid., 147.
and the language of permeation/filling. The remainder of this section and the whole of the next will be devoted to developing these responses to Alston’s position.

Two of the advantages that Alston enumerates for the sharing model are: (1) it explains how the internality of the Spirit is essentially involved in the divine work of sanctification and (2), in so doing, it makes “full communion with God” the goal of sanctification as opposed to the goal being mere moral improvement. But we argue here that on closer analysis the sharing model falters at precisely these two important points.

First, while the Spirit of God is certainly internal to the believer and is essentially involved in sanctification on the sharing model, according to Alston’s account, the internal Spirit does not actually bring about ongoing characterological change. Recall that the indwelling Spirit performs two tasks on the sharing model: one cognitive and the other conative. In virtue of sharing in the divine life, the believer has immediate cognitive awareness of God’s tendencies to act, which serves as an extremely intimate role model of the kind of life to which he calls believers. But Alston makes clear that this cognitive access in and of itself does not transform the believer. He writes, “the actual changes in the individual’s own motivational structure come from responses, voluntary and involuntary, to these models.” Alston goes on to posit the Spirit’s conative task that is apparently accomplished by fiat. He writes, “Why shouldn’t we think of participation in the divine life as consisting, in part, in the introduction into my conative system of initially weak, isolated, and fragile tendencies.” Alston does not make clear how participation in the divine life “introduces” these initial, weak tendencies. His analogy of one person’s neural wiring being hooked up to another’s neuroanatomy explains by analogy how one person could have cognitive access to God’s mental life, but it does not explain why that person’s own desires, feelings, and tendencies would thereby change in the sort of immediate and fragile way Alston posits. It appears, then, that these weak, conative tendencies are brought about by God by fiat. Importantly, this introduction by fiat would not run afoul of the objections to the fiat model considered earlier due to Alston’s view that the implanted tendencies only weakly (that is, non-deterministically) influence human behavior. Nonetheless, the point here is that however these weak tendencies come about, Alston makes it clear that actualizing them is up to the believer, with God only acting as the originator of the tendencies and a highly accessible role model for how to develop them. Alston writes, “there is plenty left for the individual to do, by way of building up the motivational system from the rudimentary beginning supplied by God.” It is precisely this “rudimentary beginning supplied by God” and the “plenty left for the individual to do” that makes it clear

36 Ibid., 147.  
37 Ibid., 146.  
38 Ibid., 146.  
40 Alston 1988, 146.
that the believer’s ongoing sanctification is not brought about through ongoing participation with the divine nature. At most the indwelling Spirit makes sanctification possible; the Spirit is the enabler and inspiration for sanctification but not the transforming power of sanctification. Ongoing sanctification is brought about by the believer’s choices in response to the Spirit’s regenerating work and vivid role modeling. But this result seems out of step with the Christian notion that the Spirit is the empowering/transformational agent of ongoing sanctification (e.g., Galatians 5:16–24). It appears that one could say of this model what St. Paul says of Galatian spirituality: “Having begun by the Spirit, are you now being perfected by the flesh [that is, self-effort]?” (Galatians 3:3).

It needs to be mentioned here that Ray Yeo (2014) has developed a “modified Alstonian partial life sharing model” through a fruitful integration of Alston with Jonathan Edwards’s account of infused grace. But it appears that Edwards’s influence pushes Yeo’s modified Alstonian view back toward an interpersonal model in order to explain how sanctification occurs through life sharing. For instance, on Yeo’s view, what the Spirit shares with believers is “the human loving disposition of Christ … consisting of a certain motivation for union and a good-seeing tendency towards God.” Notice that what is shared is the incarnate Jesus’s interpersonal, relational orientation of loving union towards God. If it is the believer’s sharing of Jesus’s interpersonal orientation toward God that brings about transformation, then this would seem to require an interpersonal understanding of the sanctification process. That is, coming to have a loving, interpersonal union with God can be understood as transformational by analogy to the way in which loving, interpersonal union with human others brings about characterological change. Yeo’s modification of Alston’s view is a substantial departure from seeing God as a vivid role model of perfect goodness. In our judgment, then, Yeo’s modification of Alston’s view is best understood along interpersonal lines and not in accord with the sharing model.

In summary, the sharing model does not explain how the internality of the Holy Spirit brings about ongoing characterological change. Rather, it reduces the transformational work of the Spirit to a weak initial change by fiat and then an intimate role modeling that leaves ongoing progress in sanctification entirely up to the believer’s efforts.

Another relevant worry is whether Christians experience such an intimate awareness of the divine life. Marilyn Adams notes that many Christians have either never or only occasionally had the sort of vivid, conscious awareness of God’s mental life as of their own that Alston proposes. Adams then charges that on the road to sanctification this immediate awareness of God “can’t be the whole story or probably even a necessary component, because such vivid cognitive access
does not seem to be available to everyone who is commonly thought to be in the process of becoming a saint.”

Presumably, there is some sort of cognitive awareness of God’s desires, thoughts, and beliefs on the part of the believer, but a more occasional and limited awareness fits well with an interpersonal model in which God communicates such ideas to the believer (much of the time below the threshold of conscious awareness) as a means of transformation.

This brings us to consider the second purported advantage of the sharing model, viz., that on the sharing model the goal of sanctification is “full communion with God.” Since Alston’s sharing model leaves ongoing characterological change up to human willpower, it is far from clear how the goal of sanctification is full communion with God. Rather, once the believer has the implanted tendencies and vivid cognitive access to the mind of God, the only unrealized goal is to make choices to strengthen those feeble tendencies for good. On such an understanding, increasing communion with God is sidelined and autonomous, moral effort takes center field. The “fullest possible sharing in the divine nature” might put more pressure on the individual to conform to God’s tendencies, but, again, it would seem that the goal is for the individual believer to rightly respond to that pressure.

A final challenge for the sharing model is that it privileges the filling/permeating language of the sanctifying work of the Spirit over and against the interpersonal language of sanctification. Alston writes, “the appropriateness of this language of filling and permeating indicates that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is of a fundamentally different character from the relationship of two human persons, however intimate, different by reason of being much more an internal matter.” The problem here is that a model of the sanctifying work of the Spirit would do better if it could do justice to both the organic/materialistic metaphors (i.e., filling/permeating) and the interpersonal metaphors. This is because while believers are to be filled with the Spirit (Ephesians 5:18), they are also to keep in step with the Spirit (Galatians 5:25); while believers are to ingest the bread of life (John 6:35), they are also to follow the good shepherd (1 Peter 2:25); while believers are to abide in Jesus as a branch abides in a vine (John 15:4), they are also to take Jesus’s yoke upon them and learn from him (Matthew 11:29); while believers are to be filled up with all fullness of God (Ephesians 3:19), they are also to know the love of God that surpasses knowledge (Ephesians 3:19); while the Spirit is poured out on believers in full measure (Titus 3:6), the Spirit also pours out the love of God in believers (Romans 5:5), and so on. Inasmuch as the sharing model is developed in a manner that makes the believer’s relationship with the Spirit disanalogous with interpersonal relationships, the sharing model is at odds with the interpersonal language of Christian sanctification.

Another way to put this point is that the interpersonal metaphors of sanctification cannot be explained by and subsumed under the organic/materialistic metaphors, while these latter metaphors can be explained by and subsumed under the interpersonal metaphors. To see this, note that it makes sense to say that a loving interpersonal relationship can nourish, fill, or permeate a person, but language is strained in saying that a nourishing, filling, or permeating thing loves a person. Nourishing, filling, permeating things ooze but they do not always love, while loving persons can, perhaps necessarily, nourish, fill, and permeate another with their love. This points toward a conceptual priority of the interpersonal language over the organic/materialistic language. Alston’s sharing model has it the other way around which curtails the explanatory power of his preferred model of the Spirit’s virtue-formational work.

This is particularly troubling given the dominance of interpersonal language in Christian Scripture as the primary description of believers’ relationship with God. For instance, the gospels record Jesus referring to God as Father over 165 times, but in comparison the gospel accounts only rarely characterize relationship with God in an organic/materialistic manner. It is in the gospel of John that we find the most references to relationship with God as organic (e.g., bread, water, vine), but in John alone Jesus refers to God as Abba over one hundred times. In these ways, there is a clear dominance of the interpersonal metaphor in Scripture. Indeed, the Pauline letters describe God as Father over forty times, including the report that the Spirit of God is crying out in human hearts “Abba, Father” (Galatians 4:6; cf., Romans 8:16). The language of God as “Father” is so common that Christians are likely to take for granted this description of the divine–human relationship when it is quite jaw-dropping that the parent–child metaphor is dominant in this way. We argue that in elevating the organic/materialistic metaphors of filling/permeating above the interpersonal metaphors, the sharing model distances itself from the witness of the Christian Scriptures.

This final critique of the sharing model contains within it a way to advance the discussion. If it makes sense to think of a loving relationship with another person as nourishing, filling, or permeating akin to the parent-child relationship, could a revamped interpersonal model do justice to the internality of the Spirit’s work? Remember that Alston briefly considered the notion that interpersonal relationships can be spoken of as internal to one’s life (“I carry some of you around with me wherever I go”), but he maintained that this sort of talk is only figurative language and that the filling/permeating language of Scripture is literal. But perhaps this move by Alston was too quick. We turn now to a reconsideration of the interpersonal model.

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6.6 The Interpersonal Model Reconsidered

It is important to note that Alston’s analysis of the interpersonal model does not clearly distinguish between different levels of interpersonal influence. For instance, while another person can externally influence you for the better through truthful communication, encouragement to do the right thing, helping you to see a crucial point about your situation, role-modeling, and the like (i.e., external moral influence), relationships with others can also impact your experience of yourself, others, and the world such that your feelings, attitudes, and desires are impacted by the relational interaction. For instance, we often say that what mattered most about someone’s help in a time of need was not so much what they said or did, but simply that they were there. Personal presence, especially personal presence that manifests love, acceptance, commitment, faithfulness, care, understanding, challenge, and so on, can leave its mark on us internally. Our feelings, attitudes, desires, thoughts, values—our overall sense of ourselves—can be influenced, positively and/or negatively, by receptivity to the meaningful presence of others. No doubt we have all had some experience of being soothed, comforted, energized, or strengthened by interaction with another, or alternatively, we might experience someone’s presence as anxiety-producing, discomfiting, draining, or disempowering. This is deeper than mere external moral influence. As the relational presence is received it alters the way we feel and perceive our situation. In other words, interpersonal relationships, however intimate, can have an internal effect on us.

Cognitive and developmental psychological theorists talk about how this internal experience of other persons can be **internalized** in an individual such that the meaningful presence of others continues to exert its influence even when we are no longer consciously aware of the other. We might think here of a child who is able to be physically separated from her mother while still maintaining the sense that her mother cares and is available to her. Using the language of psychologists John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, we can say that the child is “securely attached” to her mother and is thereby able to regulate her emotions in the mother’s absence due to the inner sense that she has not been abandoned.\(^\text{49}\) In a very real way, the child carries with her the meaningful presence of her mother and it continues to exert an influence on her inner experience even after the mother’s departure. Some theorists speak of this interpersonal dynamic as an “internalized object”\(^\text{50}\) while others use the language of an “internal working model.”\(^\text{51}\) This latter notion, an internal working model of relationships, can be understood as incorporating “two discrete yet interrelated cognitive schemas: a model of the self, containing basic perceptions of one’s own worth, competence, and lovability and another

\(^{49}\) Bowlby 1969; Ainsworth 1982; for an overview of attachment theory, see Bretherton 1992.

\(^{50}\) e.g., Fairbairn 1952.

\(^{51}\) Bowlby 1969.
model embodying core expectations regarding the essential goodness, trustworthiness, and dependability of important others in one’s social world. The point here is that the internalization of another’s relational care forms an individual’s sense of self-worth, competence, and lovability as well as the individual’s confidence that significant others are available and competent to help.

It is important to highlight the moral significance of this inner experience of worth, competence, lovability, and confidence that one is securely attached to dependable, caring others. For instance, it is a common experience that anxiety and fear can be lessened by experiencing or recalling the presence of trusted, competent, caring others (this is sometimes called “affect regulation”). Since anxiety and fear are often at the root of impatience, discontent, anger, manipulation, and the like, one’s dispositions to respond in these ways can be undermined by the lessening of anxiety and fear due to the internalized competent care of others. In the absence of fear, anxiety, discontent, and the like, a person who is receptive to the internalized competent care of others is in a position to experience increasing peace, joy, and contentment. Out of such a state of being, one is emotionally and attitudinally primed to respond with patience, generosity, self-control, compassion, forgiveness, kindness, and so on. While there is much more to say about the emotional and attitudinal underpinnings of virtuous dispositions and moral behavior, much of the recent work on moral emotions is relevant to this dimension of our discussion.

Relevant as well are various psychological studies that show that one’s core conception of God, including one’s sense of the availability of God’s relational presence, significantly impacts how and if one seeks God, especially in times of distress. In virtue of one’s learned conception of God, some will seek God for safety, while others will not. Moreover, one’s conception of God is formed through implicit and emotional experience of one’s primary caregiver, even at a very early age, which impacts what theological views of God one is inclined toward in later life. Given this association with early childhood caregiver attachments, it is not surprising that many religions conceive of God as a parental attachment figure, and that their various views of God’s perceived availability and

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52 Lopez et al. 1998; cf., Bowlby 1969; Thompson et al. 2003. 53 e.g., Dwinosaurani et al. 2014.
54 See, e.g., Hill 2015.
55 In one study among a diverse Christian sample, benevolent conceptions of God were negatively correlated with aggression and positively related to serving others, while authoritarian conceptions of God were positively correlated with aggression (Johnson et al. 2013). Other studies show that a conception of God as a loving attachment figure can predict one’s deep sense of purpose and meaning (Stroope et al. 2013), and are negatively correlated with symptoms of anxiety and depression (Pargament et al. 1988; Phillips et al. 2004; Silton et al. 2014), while a conception of God as detached and retributory attachment figure correlate with symptoms of anxiety and depression (Schaap-Jonker et al. 2002; Greenway et al. 2003; McConnell et al. 2006; Braam et al. 2008; Silton et al. 2014).
56 See Porter 2012; Porter and Baehr 2020. 57 See, for instance, Haidt 2003; Roberts 2015.
60 Hall and Fujikawa 2013.
responsiveness inform their theology and praxis. Other studies suggest that experiences of God as being reliably loving and available can significantly overcome the effects of unhealthy attachments to primary caregivers.

What we have attempted to do here is develop a conceptualization of interpersonal human relationships that has the required sense of internality to offer a helpful analogy of the indwelling ministry of the Spirit and how such relational interaction can bring about spiritual transformation in a manner that exceeds external, moral influence. We might put the relevant point as follows: Just as receptivity to a human person’s love can decrease anxiety and fear and bring about increasing peace, joy, and contentment, which can then prime dispositions to be patient, generous, self-controlled, etc., so too receptivity to a divine person’s love can decrease anxiety and fear and bring about increasing peace, joy, and contentment which can then prime dispositions to be patient, generous, and self-controlled. Indeed, divine love is unlimited, perfect, and constantly available, and is thereby capable, in principle, of the eradication of worry and fear and the consistent production of peace and joy. Akin to how human relationships can be internalized and play a role in one’s sense of self even when the human other is not consciously attended to, so too the indwelling Spirit is an internalized other that continues to exert an influence on one’s sense of self even when the believer is not consciously attending to the Spirit.

This view sees the indwelling ministry of the Spirit as a form of knowledge by acquaintance and is akin to Eleonore Stump’s work on second-personal or Franciscan knowledge of God. Knowing more propositions about the Spirit and the sanctifying process does not itself sanctify one in that it does not bring one into contact with the Spirit. As Dallas Willard observes, “Knowledge ‘at a distance,’ knowing certain ‘facts’ about something, doesn’t amount to knowing it. It therefore does not have the same power over life . . . Only the latter [knowledge by acquaintance] is the interactive relationship, the ‘reality hook,’ that gives us a grasp of the person or the thing ‘itself.’” Interpersonal knowledge—knowledge by acquaintance between persons—requires personal encounter not reducible to propositional knowledge. It is in virtue of the attentive experience of another person that we come to know them and experience their knowing us, which if one is receptive, can bring about characterological changes of varying degrees. This is at the heart of the interpersonal model.

Alston might object that the notion of relationality developed here is still disanalogous to the indwelling of the Spirit in that an internalized human person is not actually present within the individual in the way that the Spirit is actually present within the individual. While the latter claim is true, this does not make the

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63 See Rickabaugh 2013; Rickabaugh and Evans 2018.  64 Stump 2010, 75–7.
65 Willard 2009, 141.
interpersonal model problematically disanalogous to the Spirit’s indwelling. The
point of appealing to internalized relationships is to demonstrate that human
persons can influence the inner life of an individual whether or not the individual
is consciously attending to the person in question. This is the relevant sense in
which there is an analogy between human interpersonal interaction and divine–
human interpersonal interaction. The main disanalogy with the Spirit’s indwelling
is not that the Spirit has a different type of relational influence on a human person
but that the Spirit of God is continuously present to the believer and exerting his
meaningful influence. The influence of human others is finite, imperfect, and
inconsistent, while the influence of the Spirit is infinite, perfect, and constant.

One benefit of this revised interpersonal model is that it makes room for the
organic/materialistic metaphors of sanctification. The loving presence of God is
psychologically life-giving—it fills, permeates, and nourishes the human person.
Moreover, this model can allow for a similar kind of vivid awareness of God’s
mental life as Alston’s sharing model. It is consistent with an interpersonal
relationship that God impresses on believers’ minds a vivid awareness of his
thoughts, desires, values, and tendencies. Also, the interpersonal model can
account for the instantaneous change that occurs at initial, soteriological regen-
eration in that it seems quite plausible that a human person coming into intimate
contact with the third member of the Triune Godhead would bring about some
immediate improvement to a psychological system that was previously arranged
in opposition to God. Just as entering into a new relationship with a human
person can bring about an immediate psychological shift in one’s self, so we might
imagine, a fortiori, entering into a new relationship with God would bring about
an immediate psychological change in one’s self. Lastly, there is still a role for the
believer to play in sanctification, except that on this model, the goal of the
believer’s efforts is truly full communion with God. As the believer makes efforts
to actively receive more and more of the love and goodness of God in growing
communion with and dependence upon him, the believer is transformed by God’s
loving presence. Believers can quench and grieve the Spirit (1 Thessalonians 5:29
and Ephesians 4:30) or make steps to draw near to God (James 4:8) and abide in
his love (John 15:9). In this way the interpersonal model provides a way for
sanctification to be wholly a work of God’s power (i.e., the effect of his loving
presence) and yet sensitive to the role of human receptivity.66

One might worry that this model depends on contemporary psychological
timeory regarding the manner in which personal relationships influence human
psychology. While our description of the model referred to psychological theory,
the sort of relational influence discussed seems easily supported by careful reflec-
tion on common relational experience. Indeed, long before modern psychology,

66 Cf., Carpenter 2019.
the biblical writers utilized interpersonal metaphors of God’s presence to describe the sort of transformational influence alluded to above. For instance, David famously says that “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me; Your rod and Your staff, they comfort me” (Psalms 23:4). Yahweh declares, through Jeremiah, that

Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord and whose trust is the Lord. For he will be like a tree planted by the water, that extends its roots by a stream and will not fear when the heat comes; But its leaves will be green, and it will not be anxious in a year of drought nor cease to yield fruit. (Jeremiah 17:7–8)

Jesus teaches that anxiety about the basic necessities of life can be eradicated due to the reality that “your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things” and that God competently cares for those he values (Matthew 6:25–33). Paul testifies that in a particularly troubling situation “the Lord stood by me and strengthened me, so that through me the message might be fully proclaimed and all the gentiles might hear it” (2 Timothy 4:16–17). Moreover, the writer of Hebrews states,

Make sure that your character is free from the love of money, being content with what you have; for He Himself has said, “I will never desert you, nor will I ever forsake you,” so that we confidently say, “The Lord is my helper, I will not be afraid. What will man do to me?” (Hebrews 13:5–6)

In these and many other passages, we clearly see a connection between the meaningful presence of God and characterological changes such as decreasing fear and anxiety, increasing comfort, strength, boldness, and contentment. As Augustine put it, it is “by spiritually embracing Him that the intellectual soul is filled and impregnated with true virtues.”

6.7 Implications of an Interpersonal Model

We conclude by turning to a discussion of whether conceptualizing the transforming work of the Spirit in terms of an interpersonal relationship makes an important difference in one’s practice of Christian spirituality and growth in the virtues. Why split hairs between Alston’s preferred sharing model and our preferred interpersonal model? One might think that as long as believers take part in their tradition’s prescribed means of grace (e.g., prayer, Scripture meditation, receiving the Eucharist), God will bring about their sanctification by his grace

67 City of God, 10.3 (Augustine 2015).
even if their understanding of the dynamics of sanctification is faulty or incomplete. Wouldn’t a loving God transform his children whether they understand his sanctifying work as mystery, fait, sharing in the divine nature, or interpersonal relationship? While we would never want to bet against God’s gracious generosity to his children, there are some reasons to think that having a more accurate understanding of the sanctifying work of the Spirit does make a difference in one’s spiritual and moral development.

A first clue in this direction is that the biblical witness strongly suggests that understanding how the Spirit sanctifies believers is crucially important. For example, Paul goes to some length in his letters to the Galatians, Colossians, and Corinthians to correct their respective mistaken views of life in the Spirit. It appears that he does so because he thinks their continued development is partly constituted by their having a more accurate understanding of the Spirit’s work. The Galatians, for instance, have been bewitched into foolishness that has robbed them of the life-giving benefits of being in Christ (Galatians 3:1–6). It does not look like their foolish Spirituality puts them in danger of losing their salvation per se, but it does appear that it is forestalling their sanctification (see Galatians 4:8–11, 19).

But this just presses the question as to why a good and gracious God would seemingly condition his sanctifying work on a believer having an increasingly accurate understanding of how such sanctification takes place? One way to get at this is to make clear what the consequence would be if God allowed believers to be sanctified no matter their understanding of how sanctification occurs. When Christian believers are graciously transformed by God, their view of sanctification is experientially confirmed and reinforced. For instance, if I engage my tradition’s prescribed means of grace thinking that I am meriting God’s approval and I experience the Spirit’s transforming work under that description, my understanding of God’s love as something that can be earned is confirmed and reinforced by my experience of transformation. I will increasingly utilize meritorious means to earn God’s approval and I will teach those around me to do the same. Or, if I engage my tradition’s prescribed means of grace thinking that I simply

68 The problem for the Galatians was fundamentally a problem about how one is sanctified. For instance, Schreiner (2010, 184) writes of the Galatians that “the inception of their Christian life was marked by the reception of the eschatological Spirit of promise . . . But the Galatians were considering a new strategy, thinking that they could improve on relying wholly upon the Spirit. They were attracted to being ‘perfected by the flesh’ . . . [Paul] assumes that the Galatians are Christians, and thus he describes their desire to be circumcised as a misguided attempt to make progress in the Christian life on the basis of the flesh instead of the Spirit. We see here as well that the Christian life follows the same course whether the issue is justification or sanctification. It is not as if justification is through the Spirit by faith, and sanctification is by works and human effort.” Hence, Paul is at pains to correct their seeking out their sanctification according to “weak and worthless elementary principles” (Galatians 4:9). This view of sanctification apart from the Spirit is frustrating their growth in Christlikeness. Paul, Dunn (1993, 240) explains, “had not realized the process of spiritual formation of his converts would be so long drawn out and involve such further pain and anxiety on his part.”
need to exert more effort to be virtuous and I experience the Spirit’s transforming work under that description, my understanding of spiritual growth as largely due to increased self-effort will be confirmed and reinforced by my experience of transformation. I will increasingly double-down on my own willpower to bring about virtue and I will teach those around me to do the same. Because the experience of spiritual formation validates our views of the spiritual life, it is loving of God to withhold formation from us when to bring about our formation would only confirm and reinforce a distorted understanding of himself, ourselves, and what a maturing divine–human relationship actually involves. It follows from this that as persons develop a more accurate understanding of the Spirit’s sanctification, they do what they can to prepare themselves for the Spirit’s transforming work.

We are not suggesting that progress in sanctification requires a perfect understanding of sanctification. Indeed, many have held that there are developmental stages in the Christian life during which God graciously allows formation to occur while one’s understanding matures. In keeping with that, it is sensible to think that in order to develop deeper aspects of spiritual maturity, God at times chooses to condition his sanctifying work in accordance with our coming to have a more accurate understanding of ourselves, God himself, and the divine–human relationship. Such a notion is consistent with the developmental spiritualities of Bernard of Clairvaux, Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, and others who maintain that God withholds consolation in the spiritual life in order to purge Christians of their false and idolatrous illusions of both God and themselves. For instance, in early stages of the Christian life, God may condescend to us with consolation even though we are loving God for pleasure’s sake whereas as we mature he withholds that consolation in order to refine our love for him and deepen the virtues that are thereby formed in us.

On the plausible assumption that God does Christians a great good by helping them have an increasingly accurate understanding of himself, their own selves, and what it is to live in a transformational relationship with the Spirit of God, having an increasingly accurate view of the Spirit’s sanctifying work seems crucially important. In this respect, it is hard to imagine how one could do better than the interpersonal model in terms of the view of God, one’s self, and the divine–human relationship that is experientially confirmed and reinforced when sanctification occurs on this understanding of growth. Since the interpersonal

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69 Demarest 2008.
70 Coe 2000.
71 Jesus’s teaching regarding giving to the needy, prayer, and fasting in Matthew 6:1–18 is a correction of a misinformed way of engaging these spiritual practices. Jesus’s general point is that hypocrites who engage in these practices in order to be seen by others “have received their reward” (vs. 2, 5, and 16) and that his disciples are not to practice under that description. Instead, Jesus gives his disciples a different understanding of how these practices interface with his Father’s kingdom and it is based on that understanding that the practices align one with God (i.e., “And your Father who sees in secret will reward you,” Matthew 6:4, 6, 18).
model views spiritual growth as coming about through increasing receptivity to the love of God, when one experiences growth under that description, what is reinforced is the idea that God is lovingly available and that his love is transformational when received. Of course, what also becomes evident on this model is that God's loving presence challenges the dimensions of human persons that are resistant to his love.\footnote{See Moser 2013; 2014.} Since the various strategies of resisting loving, personal presence are well-known at the level of human interaction, another practical benefit of the interpersonal model is that it provides a fruitful way of conceptualizing the psychological dynamics of resisting the Spirit. Entrenched relational resistance helps explain the slowness of change that Alston notes. On an interpersonal model, the gradual nature of sanctification is at least partly explained by deeply ingrained relational resistance to the Spirit and the resultant habits of autonomous living apart from God,\footnote{Porter 2014.} which can then be addressed through the utilization of various relationally oriented spiritual practices.

### 6.8 Conclusion

Christians must take seriously the role of the Holy, or sanctifying, Spirit in Christian virtue formation. While Christians have formational strategies that do not depend on explicit knowledge of and/or interaction with the Holy Spirit, this chapter addresses the virtue-formational work that involves explicit knowledge of and/or interaction with the Holy Spirit. In doing so, we have argued that Alston’s defense of the sharing model moves too quickly over the resources available on a nuanced articulation of the interpersonal model. We contend that this nuanced version of the interpersonal model offers a more accurate treatment of the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit and that taking on a more accurate view is conducive to furthering one’s sanctification in that it enables one to interact with God more in accordance with the reality of one’s self and the reality of God’s self.

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