The Dualism Archive

Contents

  • History of Dualism

  • General Works

  • Arguments for Dualism

  • Varieties of Dualism

  • The Nature of the Dualist Self or Soul

  • Dualism & Mental Causation

  • Dualism & Science

  • Dualism in Ethics and Politics

  • More Objections to Dualism and Replies

History of Mind-Body Dualism

  • Dempsey, Liam P. (2009). “Thinking-Matter Then and Now: The Evolution of Mind-Body Dualism.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (1): 43-61.

  • Crabbe, M. James (Ed.). (1999). From Soul to Self. London: Routledge.

  • Crane, Tim, and Sarah Paterson (eds.). (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. London: Routledge.

  • Martin, Raymond and John Barresi. (2000). Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. London: Routledge.

  • MacDonald, P. S. (2003). History of the Concept of Mind, Vol. 1: Speculations about Soul, Mind, and Spirit from Homer to Hume. Hants, England: Ashgate.

  • MacDonald, P. S. (2007). History of the Concept of Mind, Vol. 2: The Heterodox and Occult Tradition. Hants, England: Ashgate.

  • Martin, Raymond and John Barresi. (2006). The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Varieties of Dualism

General Overviews

  • Eberl, Jason T. (2010). “Varieties of Dualism: Aquinas and Swinburne.” International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.

 

Cartesian Dualism

  • Alanen, Lilli. (2008). “Descartes' Mind-Body Composites, Psychology, and Naturalism.” Inquiry 51 (5): 464-484.Almog, J. (2001). What am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Balz, A. G. A. (1951). Cartesian Studies. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Brown, Gregory. (1986). “Dualism and Substance as Substratum in Descartes and Bonaventure.” Modern Schoolman 63 (2):119-132.

  • Bolzano, Bernard. (1838). Athanasia; oder Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Sulzbach: J. G. v. Seidleschen Buchhandlung.

  • Dilley, Frank B. (2004). “Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3): 135- 153.

  • Foster, John. (1996). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. London: Routledge.

  • Fowler, C. F. (1999). Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian Doctrine. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

  • Goetz, Stewart. (2005). “Substance Dualism.” In Joel. B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer (Eds.), In Search of the Soul: Four Views on the Mind-Body Problem, pp. 33-60. Downers Grover, IL: Intervarsity Press.

  • _____. (2009). “In Defense of Substance Dualism.” In Alexander Batthyany and Avshalom Eliutzur (Eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness, 95-112. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag.

  • _____. (2015). “Substance Dualism.” In Joshua R. Farris, and Charles Taliaferro (Eds.), The Ashgate Companion to Theological Anthropology, pp.  125-137. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

  • Lund, David H. (2005). The Conscious Self: The Immaterial Center of Subjective States. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

  • O'Neill, Eileen. (1987). “Mind-Body Interaction and Metaphysical Consistency: A Defense of Descartes.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (2): 227-245.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (1995). “Descartes's Case for Dualism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1): 29-63.

  • _____. (1998). Descartes’s Dualism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 

  • _____. (2010). “Descartes and the Immortality of the Soul.” In John Cottingham and Peter Hacker (Eds.), Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny, pp. 252-71. Oxford University Press.

  • Skirry, Justin. (2005). Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature. London and New York: Thoemmes-Continuum Press.

  • Smythies, John R. (1989). “The Mind-Brain Problem.” In John R. Smythies and John Beloff (Eds.), The Case for Dualism, pp. 81-111. Charlottesville, NC: University of Virginia Press. 

  • Yablo, Stephen. (1990). “The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (20): 149-201.

Emergent Dualism

  • Hasker, William. (1999). The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 

  • _____. (2000) “Reply to My Friendly Critiques.” Philosophia Christi 2 (2): 197-207.

  • _____. (2004). “Emergent Dualism: Challenge to a Materialist Consensus.” In Joel B. Green (Ed.), What About the Soul? Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology, pp. 101-115. Nashville, TN: Abington Press.

  • _____. (2005). “On Behalf of Emergent Dualism.” In Search of the Soul: Four Views on the Mind-Body Problem. Edited by Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer. Downers Grover, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005: 75-100.

  • _____. (2011). “Souls Beastly and Human,” in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, ed. Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (New York: Continuum, 2011), 202–17.  

  • _____. (2012). “The Emergence of Persons,” A Companion to Christianity and Science, ed. James Stump and Alan Padgett (London: Blackwell, 2012), 480–90.

  • _____. (2013). “Dialect of the Soul.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3): 495–509.

Contra Emergent Dualism

  • Corradini, Antonella. “Emergent Dualism.” Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Edited by Alessandro Antonietti, Antonella Corradini, and Jonathan Lowe (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

  • Rickabaugh, Brandon. (2018). “Against Emergent Dualism.” In Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, pp. 73-86. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

 

Neo-Aristotelian & Neo-Thomistic Dualism 

  • Barnes, Gordon. (2004). “Is Dualism Religiously and Morally Pernicious?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1): 99-106.

  • Hamlyn, D. W. (1978) “Aristotle's Cartesianism.” Paedia (Special Aristotle Issue): 8–15.

  • Haldane. John. (1999). “A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind.” In Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics. Edited by David. S. Oderberg. Oxford: Blackwell: 40-64.

  • _____. (1994). “Analytic Philosophy and the Nature of Mind: Time for Another Rebirth?” In The Mind Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Edited by Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka. Oxford: Blackwell: 195-203. 

  • Mawson, T. J. (2011). “Substance Dualism.” In The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Garvey, James. London, GB: Continuum.

  • Moreland, J. P. (2015). “Tweaking Dallas Willard’s Ontology of the Human Person.” Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care 8 (2): 187-202.

  • _____. (2018). “In Defense of a Thomistic-like Dualism.” In Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J.P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Mind-body Dualism, pp. 102-122. UK: Blackwell.

  • Oderberg, David S. (2005). “Hylemorphic Dualism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 22: 70–99.

  • Robinson, Howard. (1983). “Aristotelian Dualism.” In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol 1. Edited by Julia Annas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • _____. (1991). “Form and the Immateriality of the Intellect from Aristotle to Aquinas.” In H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.). Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Supplementary Volume). Oxford University Press, 207-26.

 

Contra Neo-Aristotelian/Neo-Thomistic Mind-Body Dualism

  • Hasker, William. (2013). “Dialect of the Soul.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3): 495–509.

  • Freddoso, Alfred. (2001). “Good News, Your Soul Hasn’t Died Quite Yet,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75: 89–90.

  • Robinson, Howard. (2014). “Modern Hylomorphism and the Reality and Causal Power of Structure: A Skeptical Investigation.” Res Philosophica 91 (2): 203–214.

 

Hylomorphic Dualism

  • Adams, Marilyn McCord. (2016). “What About Hylomorphism? Some Medieval and Recent Ruminations on Swinburne’s Dualism.” In Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Eds.), Reason and Faith, Themes from Richard Swinburne, pp. 220-244. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Barnes, Gordon. (2001). “Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists?” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.

  • Cooney, Brian Patrick. (1992). A Hylomorphic Theory of Mind. Peter Lang Publishing.

  • De Haan, Daniel. (2017). “Hylomorphism and the New Mechanism in Biology, Neuroscience, and Psychology.” In William M. R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons and Nicholas J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • Eberl, Jason T. (2010). “Varieties of Dualism: Aquinas and Swinburne.” International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.

  • Freddoso, Alfred J. (2015). “No Room at the Inn: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Meets Thomistic Philosophical Anthropology.” Acta Philosophica 1 (24): 15-30.

  • Haldane, John. (1994). “Analytic Philosophy and the Nature of Mind: Time for Another Rebirth?” In Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka (eds.). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, 195-203. Oxford: Blackwell. 

  • Haldane, John. (1999). “A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind.” In David. S. Oderberg. Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics, pp. 40-64. Oxford: Blackwell. 

  • Haldane, John. (2000). “The State and Fate of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3): 301-21.

  • Haldane, John. (2010). “Kenny and Aquinas on Mind and Metaphysics.” In Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny, edited by John Cottingham and Peter Hacker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Haldane, John. (2013). “Is the Soul the Form of the Body?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3): 481–493.

  • Klima, Gyula. (2002). “Man= Body+ Soul: Aquinas's Arithmetic of Human Nature.” In Brian Davies (ed.), Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 257-274. Oxford University Press.

  • Koons, Robert C., and Alexander Pruss. (2017). "Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians?" In Causal Powers, edited by Jonathan D. Jacobs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Lee, Patrick, and Robert P. George. (2008). Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics. Cambridge University Press.

  • Oderberg, David S. (2005). “Hylemorphic Dualism.” In Personal Identity, edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, pp. 70-99. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 

  • Pasnau, Robert. (2012). “Mind and Hylomorphism.” In John Marenbon (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

  • Reimers, Adrian J. The Soul of the Person: A Contemporary Philosophical Psychology. Catholic University of America Press, 2006.

  • Robinson, Howard. (1991). “Form and the Immateriality of the Intellect from Aristotle to Aquinas.” In: Aristotle and the Later Tradition: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 207-26.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (2003). “Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism.” Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2): 343-367.

  • Runggaldier, Edmund. (2006). “The Aristotelian Alternative to Functionalism and Dualism.” In Die menschliche Seele Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Edited by Bruno Niederbacher and Edmund Runggaldier. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 221-247.

  • Skirry, Justin. (2001). “A Hylomorphic Interpretation of Descartes's Theory of Mind-Body Union.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75: 267-283.

Arguments for Dualism​​

Knowledge Argument 

  • Fumerton, Richard. (2013). Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Jackson, Frank. (1982). “What Mary Didn’t Know” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1982): 291-295.,

  • _____. (1986). “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1986): 127-136.

  • Moreland. J. P. (2003). “The Knowledge Argument Revisited.” International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2) (170): 219-38.

  • Nagel, Thomas. (1974). “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83: 435-50.

  • Robinson, Howard. (1993a). “The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the ‘Knowledge Argument’.” In Objections to Physicalism. Edited by Howard Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon: 159-84.

  • _____. (1993b). “Dennett on the Knowledge Argument.” Analysis 53(3): 174-7.

  • _____. (2015). “Phenomenal Qualities: What They Must Be and What They Cannot Be.” In Phenomenal Qualities: Sense,

  • Perception, and Consciousness. Edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 103-20.

  • _____. (2016). From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Near-Death Experience Arguments

  • Betty, L. Stafford. (2004). “Mind, Paranormal Experience, and the Inadequacy of Materialism.” International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):373-392.

  • Goller, Hans. (2010). “Are Near-Death Experiences Evidence for the Soul?” In Soul: A Comparative Approach. Edited by Christian Kanzian and Muhammad Legenhausen. Frankfurt: Ontos, 2010: 63-84.

  • Lund, David H. (2009). Persons, Souls, and Death: A Philosophical Investigation of an Afterlife. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.

  • Miller, J. Steve. (2012). Near-Death Experiences as Evidence for the Existence of God and Heaven: A Brief Introduction in Plain Language. Acworth, GA: wisdom Creek Press.

  • Moreland, JP, and Gary Habermas. (1998/2004). Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality. Grand Rapids, MI: Crossway. Reprinted by Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock. 

 

Arguments from the Unity of Consciousness

  • Butler, Joseph. (1736). The Analogy of Religion. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Clark, Samuel. (1738). “Four Defenses of a Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” In The Works of Samuel Clarke. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Hill, Benjamin. (2007). “Why We Can No Longer Rationally Believe that Our Intellective Soul Is a Substantial Form: On the Degringolade of the Simplicity Argument.” American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the ACPA, 80: 127-39.​

  • Gasparov, Igor. (2013). “Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.” Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1): 109-123.

  • Lennon, Thomas M., and Stainton, Robert J. (eds.). (2008). The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology. Springer.

  • Lotze, Hermann. (1884). Outlines of Psychology. Minneapolis: S. M. Williams.

  • Lund, D. H. (2005). The Conscious Self: The Immaterial Center of Subjective States. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.

  • Hasker, William. (1999) The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 122-146. 

  • _____. (2009) “Persons and the Unity of Consciousness.” In Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (Eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, 175-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • _____. (2016). “A Rejoinder to O’Connor.” In Thomas M. Crisp, Steven Porter, Gregg A. Ten Elshof (Eds.), Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology, pp. 47-50. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.  

  • Hoffman, Paul. (1986). “The Unity of Descartes's Man.” Philosophical Review 95 (3): 339-370.

  • Mijuskovic, Ben Lazare, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

  • Moreland, J. P. (2018). “Substance Dualism and the Diachronic/Synchronic Unity of Consciousness.” In R. Keith Loftin and Joshua R. Farris (Eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms, pp. 43-73. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books.

  • _____. (2018). “Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.” In Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, pp. 184-207. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (2012) “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul.” In The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez. Edited by Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 154-172.

  • Twardowski, Kazimierz. (2014). “Metaphysics of the Soul.” In Anna Brozek and Jacek Jadacki (eds.). On Prejudices, Judgments and Other Topics in Philosophy, pp. 197-209. Amsterdam-New York, NY: Rodopi B. V./Brill.


Contra Unity of Consciousness Arguments

  • Bayne, Tim. (2018). “Problems with Unity of Consciousness Arguments for Substance Dualism.” In Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, pp. 208-224. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • Corcoran, Kevin J. (2006) Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.

  • Kanzian, Christian. (2012) “Is “Person” a Sortal Term?” Person Identity: Complex or Simple? Edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Madden, James D. (2013) Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

  • O’Connor, Tim. (2016). “Materially Composed Persons and the Unity of Consciousness: A Reply to Hasker.” In Thomas M. Crisp, Steven Porter, Gregg A. Ten Elshof (Eds.), Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology, pp. 41-46. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 

  • Shrader, Warner. (2006) “The Unity of Consciousness: Trouble for the Materialist or the Emergent Dualist?” Faith & Philosophy 23 (1): 33-44.

Modal Arguments for Dualism

  • Garcia, Robert K. (2014). “Descartes's Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.

  • Rojka, Ľuboš. (2016). “The Modal Argument for Soul/Body Dualism.” Studia Neoaristotelica 13 (1):45-70.

  • Taliaferro, Charles. (1986). “A Modal Argument for Dualism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1): 95-108.

  • _____.  (1995). “Animals, Brains, and Spirits.” Faith and Philosophy 12 (4): 567-581


Contra Modal Arguments for Dualism

  • Goetz, Stewart. (2001). “Modal Dualism: A Critique.” In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body and Survival, 89–104. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Hasker, William. (1998). “Swinburne's Modal Argument for Dualism.” Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):366-370.

 

From Property Dualism to Mind-Body Dualism 

  • Lycan, William G. (2013) “Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?” Philosophical Studies 164 (2): 533-542.

  • Hawthorne, John and Jeffrey K. McDonough. (1998). “Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism.” Philosophical Perspectives 12: 349-71.

  • Schneider, Susan. (2012) “Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 157 (1): 61-76.

  • _____.  (2013) “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem” 1. Noûs 47 (1): 135-153.

  • Zimmerman, Dean. (2010) “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84 (1): 119 - 150. 

 

Contra Arguments from Property Dualism to Mind-Body Dualism

  • Mackie, Penelope. (2011) “Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1): 181-199.

  • Yang, Eric. (2015) “The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism.” Philosophical Studies 172 (12): 3211-3219.

 

Unger’s Mental Problem of the Many Argument 

  • Unger, Peter. (2002). “Free Will and Scientiphicalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 18-21. 

  • Unger, Peter. (2004) “The Mental Problems of the Many.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1. Edited by Dean Zimmerman. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 196-222.

  • Unger, Peter. (2006). All the Power in the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Simplicity Arguments for Dualism

  • Hill, Benjamin. (2007) “Why We Can No Longer Rationally Believe that Our Intellective Soul Is a Substantial Form: On the Degringolade of the Simplicity Argument.” American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the ACPA 80: 127-39.

  • Barnett, David. (2008) “The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on the Philosophy of Mind” Noûs 42: 308-355.

  • _____. (2010) “You are Simple.” In The Waning of Materialism. Edited by Robert Koons and George Bealer. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161-174.

  • _____. “Simple Souls and the Philosophy of Mind.” Unpublished paper.

  • _____. “On the Simplicity of Conscious Beings.” Unpublished paper. 

  • Chisholm, Roderick. (1976) Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (Chicago: Il: Open Court).

  • _____. (1991) “On the Simplicity of the Soul.” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 167-181.

  • Lowe, E. J. (2000) “In Defense of the Simplicity Argument.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78:1, 105-112.

  • _____. (2001). “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.” In Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Edited by Kevin Corcoran. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 139-158

Contra Simplicity Argument

  • Bailey, Andrew. (2014). “You Needn’t Be Simple.” Philosophical Papers 43 (2): 145-160.

  • Madden, Rory. (2015). “The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject.” Noûs 49 (1): 55-70.

  • Yang, Eric. (2018). “Persons, Simplicity, and Substance.” Philosophical Papers 47 (2): 299-311.

Intentionality Arguments for Dualism

  • Willard, Dallas. (2011). “Intentionality and the Substance of the Self.” Philosophia Christi 13 (1): 7-20.

  • Willard, Dallas, and Brandon Rickabaugh, “Intentionality Contra Physicalism: On the Mind’s Independence from the Body.” Philosophia Christi 20 (2) (2019): 497-515.

Moral Arguments for Dualism

  • Bailey, Andrew M., and Joshua Rasmussen. (2016). “How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2): 332-343.

  • Cooper, Marjorie J. (2007). “Are We Sending Mixed Messages? How Philosophical Naturalism Erodes Ethical Instruction.” Journal of Business Ethics 75 (2):171-180.

  • Harrison, Gerald K. (2016), “A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21-35.

 

Sensation-Based Arguments for Dualism

  • Dempsey, Liam P. (2010). “An Early Sensation-Based Argument for Dualism.”  Locke Studies 10:159-177.

 

Conceptual Arguments for Dualism

  • Moreland, J. P. (2013) “A Conceptual Argument for Spiritual Substantial Soul.” Religious Studies 49 (1): 35 43.

 

Contra Conceptual Arguments for Dualism

  • Bailey, Andrew M. (2017). “On the Concept of a Spirit.” Religious Studies 53 (4): 449-457.

 

Self-Awareness Arguments for Dualism

  • Moreland, J. P. (2011) “Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness.” Philosophia Christi 13 (1): 21-34.  

 

First-Personal Arguments for Dualism

  • Lund, David H. (1990). “Disembodied Existence, Personal Identity, and the First Person Perspective,” Idealistic Studies 20 (3):187-202.

 

Transtemporal Identity Arguments for Dualism

  • Nida-Rümelin, Martine. (2013). “The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714. 

    _____. (2013). "The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714.

 

Contra Transtemporal Identity Arguments for Dualism

  • Ludwig, Kirk. (2013). “The Argument for Subject-Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 684-701.

  • _____. (2017). “Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-Body Dualism.” European Journal for Analytic Philosophy 13 (1): 5-25.

 

Causal Arguments for Dualism

  • Saad, Bradford (2017). “A Causal Argument for Dualism.” Philosophical Studies (online) DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0969-3

 

Belief in Dualism as Properly Basic

  • Goetz, Stewart. (2005). “Substance Dualism.” In Joel. B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer (Eds.), In Search of the Soul: Four Views on the Mind-Body Problem, pp. 33-60. Downers Grover, IL: Intervarsity Press.

Dualism & Mental Causation 

  • Audi, Paul. (2011). “Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem.” Ratio XXIV (1): 1-16.

  • Bailey, Andrew M., Joshua Rasmussen, and Luke van Horn (2011). “No Pairing Problem.” Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.

  • Engelhardt, Jeff. (2017). “Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.” Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.

  • Foster, John. (1989). “Psycho-Physical Causal Relations.” American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 64–70.

  • Goetz, Stewart (2013). “Purposeful Explanation and Causal Gaps.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1): 141-55. 

  • Kroedel, Thomas. (2015). “Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem.” Noûs 49 (2):357-375.

  • Lowe, E. J. (1992). “The Problem of Psychophysical Causation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 263–276. 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2001). “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.” In K. Corcoran (Ed.), Soul, body, and survival: Essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

  • Lowe, E. J. (2003). “Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation.” In Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) Physicalism and Mental Causation, pp. 137–54. Imprint Academic.

  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis, 65(1), 5–23. Lowe, E. J. (2008). Personal Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Meixner, Uwe. (2008). “New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15:17–38.

  • Swedenborg, Emanuel. (1769/1871). The Nature of the Intercourse Between The Soul and The Body: Which Is Supposed to Be Effective Either by Physical Influx, or by Spiritual Influx, or by Pre-Established Harmony. In Miscellaneous Theological Works of Emmanuel Swedenborg, pp.253-86. New York: American Swedenborg Printing and Publishing Society.

  • Swinburne, Richard. (2011). “Dualism and the Determination of Action.” In Richard Swinburne (eds.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Vasilyev, Vadim V (2009). “The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism.” Faith & Philosophy 26 (5): 514-26.

The Nature of the Dualist Self/Soul

General Works on the Nature of the Soul

  • Frank, S. L., and Boris Jakim. (1993). Man’s Soul: An Introductory Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

  • Goetz, Stewart and Charles Taliaferro. (2011). A Brief History of the Soul. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • Moreland, J. P. (2015). “Tweaking Dallas Willard’s Ontology of the Human Person.” Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care 8 (2): 187-202. 

  • Tennant, R. F. (1956). Philosophical Theology, Vol. 1: The Soul and Its Faculties. Cambridge: The University Press.

  • Willard, Dallas. (2002). Renovation of the Heart: Putting on the Character of Christ. Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress.

Embodiment

  • Evans, Stephen C. and Brandon Rickabaugh (2015). “What Does it Mean to Be a Bodily Soul? Philosophia Christi 17 (2): 315-330.

  • Harrison. Jonathan. (1973-74). “The Embodiment of Mind or What Use is Having a Body?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: 33-55.

  • Moreland, J. P. (2015). “Tweaking Dallas Willard’s Ontology of the Human Person.” Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care 8 (2): 187-202. 

  • Price, H. H. (1969). Thinking and Experience (London: Hutchinson).

  • Rickabaugh, Brandon (2017). “Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.” In Loftin and Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms, pp. 295-317. Lexington Books.  

  • Robinson Howard. (1987). “A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development.” In J. A. Russell (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 119-39.

  • Robinson, Howard. (1989).  “A Dualist Account of Embodiment.” In John R. Smythies and John Beloff (eds.). The Case for Dualism, 43-57. Charlottesville, NC: University of Virginia Press.

  • Swinburne, Richard. (2003). “What’s So Good About Having a Body?” In Timothy Walter Bartel (Ed.), Comparative Theology: Essays for Keith Ward. Spck Publishing.

  • Taliaferro, Charles. (2001). “The Virtues of Embodiment.” Philosophy 76 (2001): 111-125.

  • Zaner, Richard M. (1971). The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body. Second Edition. Netherlands: The Hague, M. Nijhoff.

  • Vasilyev, Vadim V (2009). “The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism.” Faith & Philosophy 26 (5): 514-26.

Holenmerism

  • Broad, C. D. (1953). Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research, pp. 130-32. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

  • Kochiras, Hylarie. (2012). “Spiritual Presence and Dimensional Space Beyond the Cosmos.” Intellectual History Review 22 (1): 41-68.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (2003). “Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism.” Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2): 343-367.

  • Skirry, Justin. (2001). “A Hylomorphic Interpretation of Descartes's Theory of Mind-Body Union.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (75): 267-283.

 

The Immateriality of the Soul

  • Krantz, Susan. (1989). “Brentano's Argument Against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul.” Brentano Studien 1: 63-74.

 

Parts of the Soul

  • Perler, Dominik and Klaus Corcilius (eds.), (2014) Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz. Berlin: De Gruyter.  

  • Smith, Barry. (1988). “The Soul and Its Parts: A Study in Aristotle and Brentano.” Brentano-Studien (1): 75–88.

 

The Simplicity of the Soul

  • Barry, Galen. (2015). “Cartesian Modes and the Simplicity of Mind.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1): 54-76.

  • Hill, Benjamin. (2007). “Why We Can No Longer Rationally Believe that Our Intellective Soul Is a Substantial Form: On the Degringolade of the Simplicity Argument.” American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the ACPA (80): 127-39.

  • Levey, Samuel. (2003). “On Simplicity: Leibniz-Arnauld Revisited.” Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):  245-275.

  • Lowe, E. J. (2001). “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.” In K. Corcoran (Ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

  • Moreland, J.P. (2018). “In Defense of a Thomistic Like Dualism.” In Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (2014). “The Faces of Simplicity in Descartes’s Soul.” In Dominik Perler and Klaus Corcilius (Eds.), Partitioning the Soul: Debates From Plato to Leibniz, pp. 219-244. De Gruyter.

 

The Soul as Spatially Extended

  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). “Non-Cartesian Dualism and The Problem of Mental Causation.” Erkenntnis 65:5–23.

 

Soul-Body Relationship

  • Collins, Robin. (2011). “Energy of the Soul.” In Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (Eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigation into the Existence of the Soul. New York, NY: Continuum. 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). “Non-Cartesian Dualism and The Problem of Mental Causation.” Erkenntnis 65:5–23.

  • Moreland, J.P. (2018). “In Defense of a Thomistic Like Dualism.” In Loose, Menuge, and Moreland (eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

  • Robinson Howard. (1987). “A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development.” In J. A. Russell (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology, pp. 119-39. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  • South, James B. (2012) “Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul’s Dependence on the Body.” In Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Ed.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, pp. 121-136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Unity of the Soul

  • Butler, Joseph. (1736) The Analogy of Religion. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Clark, Samuel. (1738). “Four Defenses of a Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” In The Works of Samuel Clarke. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Hill, Benjamin. (2006) “Why We Can No Longer Rationally Believe That Our Intellective Soul is a Substantial Form: On the Degringolade of the Simplicity Argument.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80: 127-139. 

  • Kant, Immanuel. (1781/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyer and A. Wood (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

  • Lennon, Thomas M., and Stainton, Robert J. (eds.). (2008). The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology. Springer.

  • Lotze, Hermann. (1885) Outlines of Psychology. Minneapolis: S. M. Williams.

  • Hoffman, Paul. (1986). “The Unity of Descartes's Man.” Philosophical Review 95 (3): 339-370.

  • Mijuskovic, Ben Lazare. (1974). The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

  • Rozemond, Marleen. (2012). “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul.” In Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Eds.), pp. 154-172. The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Twardowski, Kazimierz. (2014). “Metaphysics of the Soul.” In Anna Brozek and Jacek Jadacki (Eds.), On Prejudices, Judgments and Other Topics in Philosophy, pp. 197-209. Amsterdam-New York, NY: Rodophi B. V./Brill.

 

Immortality of the Soul

  • Twardowski, Kazimierz. (2014). “Contemporary Philosophy on the Immortality of the Soul.” In Anna Brozek and Jacek Jadacki (eds.). On Prejudices, Judgments and Other Topics in Philosophy, pp. 187-86. Amsterdam-New York, NY: Rodophi B. V./Brill.

Dualism & Science 

General Works

  • Baker, Mark C. “Brains and Souls; Grammar and Speaking.” In Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigation into the Existence of the Soul. pp. 73-98. New York, NY: Continuum.

  • Collins, Robin. (2011). “Energy of the Soul.” In Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (Eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigation into the Existence of the Soul, pp. 123-137. New York, NY: Continuum. 

  • Collins, Robin. (2011). “A Scientific Case for the Soul.” In Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (Eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigation into the Existence of the Soul, pp. 222-246. New York, NY: Continuum. 

  • Halvorson, Hans. (2011). “The Measure of All Things: Quantum Mechanics and the Soul.” In Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigation into the Existence of the Soul, pp. 138-167. New York, NY: Continuum.

 

Neuroscience & Dualism

  • Batthyany, Alexander. (2009). “Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.” In Elexander Batthyany and Avshalom Eliutzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag: 135-162.

  • Beck, Friedrich (2008). “Mind, Brain, and Dualism in Modern Physics.” In A. Antonietti, A. Corradini, and E. J. Lowe (Eds.).  Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach. 69-98. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

  • Castelein, John. (2007). “Bless the Lord, O My Brain?! Has Neuroscience Eliminated the Soul.” Stone-Campbell Journal 10: 37-61. 

  • Crisp, Thomas M., Steven Porter, Gregg A. Ten Elshof (Eds.). (2016). Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

  • García-Valdecasas, Miguel, José Ignacio Murillo, and Nathaniel F. Barrett (Eds) (2016). Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to Non-Reductive Neuroscience. Springer

  • LaRock, Eric. (2008) “Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?” International Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (2) (190) (June): 201-229.

  • _____. (2016). “Neuroscience and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.” In Thomas M. Crisp, Steven Porter, Gregg A. Ten Elshof (Eds.), Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology, pp. 151-80. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

  • LaRock, Eric, and Robbin Collins. (2016). “Saving Our Souls from Materialism.” In Thomas M. Crisp, Steven Porter, Gregg A. Ten Elshof (Eds.), Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology, pp. 137-46. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

  • Lipkind, Michael. (2009). “The Hard Problem and the Naturalistic Meaning of the Extra Ingredient.” In Elexander Batthyany and Avshalom Eliutzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag: 207-302.

  • Loveland, Paul. (2009). “On Thermodynamics, Mind, and the Cerebral Readiness Potential: A Novel Aspect of the Mind-Brain Relationship.” In Elexander Batthyany and Avshalom Eliutzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag: 163-178.

  • MacLennan, Bruce. (2009). “Protophenomena: The Elements of Consciousness and their Relation to the Brain.” In Elexander Batthyany and Avshalom Eliutzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag: 179-206.

  • Manzotti, Riccardo, and Moderato, Paolo. (2014) “Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise.” In Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. Edited by Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson. New York, NY: Routledge: 81-97.

  • Moreland, J. P. (2012). “Christianity, Neuroscience, and Dualism.” In J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

  • Rickabaugh, Brandon, and C. Stephen Evans (2018). “Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.” In Loftin and Farris (eds.). Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms, pp. 231-256. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.  

  • Taliaferro, Charles. (1997). “Saving Our Souls: Hacking's Archaeology and Churchland's Neurology”. Inquiry 40 (1): 73-94. 

 

Cognitive Science & Dualism

  • Barrett, Justin L. (2004). “The Naturalness of Religious Concepts: An Emerging Cognitive Science of Religion,” in P. Antes, A. Geertz and R. R. Warne (eds.), New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 2: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches, pp. 401–18, Berlin: de Gruyter.

  • Barrett, Justin L. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

  • Barrett, Justin L. (2011). Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds. West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press.

  • Kuhlmeier, V. A., Bloom, P., & Wynn, K. (2004). “Do 5-month-old Infants See Humans as Material Objects?” Cognition 94 (1): 95–103.

  • Bering, J.M. (2006). “The Folk Psychology of Souls.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29: 453–98.

  • Bloom, Paul. (2004). Descartes’s Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human. New York, NY: Basic Books. 

  • Bloom, Paul. (2007). “Religion Is Natural.” Developmental Science 10: 147–51.

  • Bloom, Paul. (2009). “Religious Belief as an Evolutionary Accident.” In Michael Murray and Jeffrey Schloss (Eds.), The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion, pp, 118–27. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Demertzi, Athena, et al. (2009). “Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind,” Disorders of Consciousness: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1157: 1–9.

  • Johnson, C.N. (1990). “If You had My Brain, Where Would I Be? Children’s Understanding of the Brain and Identity.” Child Development 61 (4): 962–72.

  • Johnson, C.N., and H.M. Wellman. (1982). “Children’s Developing Conceptions of the Mind and Brain.” Child Development 53 (1): 222–34.

  • Johnson, S.C. (2000). “The Recognition of Mentalistic Agents in Infancy.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4: 22–28.

  • Preston, Jesse Lee, et al. (2013). “Neuroscience and the Soul: Competing Explanations for the Human Experience.” Cognition 127: 31–37.

  • Rickabaugh, Brandon. (forthcoming). “Alister McGrath’s Anti-Mind-Body Dualism:
    Neuroscientific and Philosophical Quandaries for Christian Physicalism
    .” Trinity Journal.

  • Wellman, Henry M. (1990). The Child's Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Wellman, Henry M., and D. Estes. (1986). “Early Understanding of Mental Entities: A Re-Examination of Childhood Realism.” Child Development 57: 910–23.

  • Wellman, Henry M., and A.K. Hickling. (1994). “The Minds “I”: Children’s Conception of the Mind as an Active Agent.” Child Development 65: 1564–80.

Objections to Dualism and Replies

General Objections to Dualism

  1. Honnacker, Anna, et al. (2008). “Substance Dualism Substantially Duelled.” In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer and Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, pp. 113-124. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Replies to General Objections to Dualism

Lycan, William. (2009). “Giving Dualism its Due.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551–56.

Rodrigues, José Gusmão. (2014). “There are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism.” Philosophy 89 (02): 199-222.

 

Interaction, Causal Paring, and Causal Closure Objections 

  • Anderson, Christopher J. (2001). Can Ockham's Razor Cut Through the Mind-Body Problem? A Critical Examination of Churchland's "Raze Dualism" Argument for Materialism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):46-60.

  • Bailey, Andrew M., Joshua Rasmussen, and Luke van Horn (2011). “No Pairing Problem.” Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.

  • Foster, John. (1993). “Dennett's Rejection of Dualism.” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 36: 17-31.

  • Jehle, D. (2006). “Kim Against Dualism.” Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.

  • Lycan, William. (2009). “Giving Dualism its Due.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551–56.

  • Moreland, J. P., and Rickabaugh, Brandon (forthcoming). “Introspecting Dualism Vindicated.”

  • Rodrigues, José Gusmão. (2014). “There are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism.” Philosophy 89 (02): 199-222.

Objections to Introspection Arguments for Dualism 

  • Moreland, J. P., and Rickabaugh, Brandon (forthcoming). “Introspecting Dualism Vindicated.”

Individuation Problems

  • Taliaferro, Charles. (1986). “Dualism and the Problem of Individuation.” Religious Studies 22 (2): 263-276.

Dualism in Ethics & Politics 

  • Cooper, Marjorie J. (2007). “Are We Sending Mixed Messages? How Philosophical Naturalism Erodes Ethical Instruction.” Journal of Business Ethics 75 (2):171-180.

  • Harrison, Gerald K. (2016), “A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21-35.

  • Moreland, J. P., and Scott B. Rae. (2000). Body & Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press). 

  • Milbank, John. (2012). “The Politics of the Soul,” ABC Religion and Ethics (Australian Broadcasting Network, Nov. 7). Available online here.

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