The Philosophy of Mind Archive

Contents

  • General Works

  • Reductionism

  • Challenges to Reductionism

  • Main Alternatives to Reductionism

General Works

Edited Volumes

  • Chalmers, David. (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Heil, John. (ed.) (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • McLaughlin, Brian P., Beckermann, Ansgar, and Walter, Sven. (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

  • Morton, Peter A. (2010). A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Readings with Commentary. Second Edition. Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press.

  • O'Connor, Timothy, and Robb, David. (eds.) (2003). Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. New York, NY: Routledge.

​​

Introductions

  • Heil, John. (2012). Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Jaworski, William. (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Kim, Jaegwon. (2010). Philosophy of Mind (Third Edition). Boulder: Westview Press.
    Lowe, E. J. (2000). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Debates/Exchanges

  • Gertler, Brie, and Shapiro, Lawrence. (2007). Arguing About the Mind. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • McLaughlin, Brian P., and Cohen, & Jonathan D. (eds.) (2007). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.​

Reductionism

Physicalism in General

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge.

  • Crane, Tim. and Mellor, D.H. (1990). “There is No Question of Physicalism.” Mind 99: 185–206.

  • Davidson, Donald. (1970). “Mental Events.” in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207–223.

  • Dowell, J.L. (2006). “Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 131(1): 1–23.

  • Gillet, C. and Loewer, B. (2001). Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Hawthorne, John. (2002). “Blocking Definitions of Materialism.” Philosophical Studies 110(2): 103–113.

  • Jackson, Frank. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1993). Mind and Supervenience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1998). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (2005). Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Lewis, David. (1994). “Reduction of Mind.” In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell: 412–431.

  • Melnyk A. (1997). “How To Keep The ‘Physical’.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 622–637.

  • _____. (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Montero, B. and Papineau, D. (2005). “A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism.” Analysis 65 (3): 233–237.

  • Neurath, O. (1931). “Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Vienna Circle.” In R.S. Cohen, and M. Neurath (eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983: 48–51.

  • Ney, A. (2008). “Physicalism as an Attitude” Philosophical Studies 138: 1–15.

  • Papineau, David. (1996). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • _____. (2002). Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See chapter 2 and the appendix.

  • Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Routledge.

  • Smart, J.J.C., (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Reprinted in D. Rosenthal (ed.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.

  • _____. (1978). “The Content of Physicalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 28: 239–41.

  • Stoljar, Daniel. (2000). “Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori.” Journal of Philosophy 97 (1): 33–54.

  • _____. (2001). “Two Conceptions of the Physical.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 253–281.

  • _____. (2010). Physicalism. New York: Routledge.

  • _____. (2015). “Physicalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/physicalism/>.

  • Stroud, B. (1986). “The Physical World.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 263–277.

  • Van Cleve, James. (1990). “Supervenience and Closure.” Philosophical Studies 58: 225–283.

  • Wilson, J. (1999). “How Superduper does a Phyisicalist Supervenience need to be?” Philosophical Quarterly 49: 33–52.

  • _____. (2005). “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism.” Nous 39:3: 426–459.

  • _____. (2006). “On Characterizing the Physical.” Philosophical Studies 131: 61–99.

  • Yolton, R. (1983). Thinking Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 

The Structure of Physicalism    

  • Oppenheim, Paul, and Putnam, Hillary. (1958). “The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” In Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds.). University of Minnesota Press. 

  • Kim, J. (1998). Reduction, problems of. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge, URL <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/reduction-problems-of/v-1/>

  • Horgan, Terence. (1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind 102 (408): 555-86.

Functionalist Reductionism    

  • Armstrong, David. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.

  • _____. (1981). The Nature of Mind. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

  • _____. (1993). “Causes are Perceived and Introspected.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(1): 29–29.

  • Block, Ned. (1980). “Troubles With Functionalism.” In Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 268–305.

  • Churchland, Paul. (2005). “Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 33–50.

  • Davidson, Donald. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne (eds.). (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson. (2002). “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Chalmers,

  • David. (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mind. New York. Oxford University Press, 520–533.

  • Levin, J. (1985). “Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (Supplement): 85–104.

  • _____. (1986). “Could Love be Like a Heatwave?” Philosophical Studies 49: 245–261.

  • _____. (1998). “Must Reasons be Rational?” Philosophy of Science 55: 199–217.

  • _____. (2013). “Functionalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = \<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/functionalism/>.

  • Lewis, D. (1972. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, in Block 1980, 207–215.

  • _____. (1980). “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” In Block 1980: 216–222.

  • Malcolm, N. (1968). “The Conceivability of Mechanism.” Philosophical Review 77: 45–72.

  • McCullagh, M. (2000). “Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.” Mind and Language 15(5): 481–499.

  • McDowell, J. (1985). “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism.” In E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 387–398.

  • McLaughlin, B. (2006). “Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenaliam?” Consciousness Studies 13 (1–2): 39–66.

  • Piccinini, G. (2004). “Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental States.” Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35: 811–833.

  • Place, U.T., 1956. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology 47: 44–50.

  • Putnam, H., 1960. “Minds and Machines.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 362–385.

  • _____. (1963). “Brains and Behavior.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 325–341.

  • _____. (1975a). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 215–271.

  • _____. (1975b). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Rupert, R. (2006). “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessitated Effects.” Noûs 40: 256–283.

  • Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutcheson.

  • Schaffer, J. (2003). “Overdetermining Causes.” Philosophical Studies 114: 23–45.

  • Searle, John. (1980). “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–457

  • _____. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Shagrir, O, (2005). “The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism.” In Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 220–250

  • Shoemaker, Sydney. (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1984a). “Functionalism and Qualia.” In Shoemaker 1984: 184–205.

  • _____. (1984b). “Some varieties of functionalism.” In Shoemaker 1984: 261–286.

  • _____. (2001). “Realization and Mental Causation.” In C. Gillet and B. Loewer, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–98.

  • Smart, J.J.C, (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Philosophical Review 68: 141–156.

  • Sprevak, M. (2009). “Extended cognition and functionalism.” Journal of Philosophy 106(9): 503–527.

  • Stalnaker, Robert. (2002). “What is it Like to Be a Zombie?” In Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 385–400.

  • Tooley, M. (2001). “Functional Concepts, Referentially Opaque Contexts, Causal Relations, and the Definition of Theoretical Terms.” Philosophical Studies 105(3): 251–279.

Content Externalism    

  • Davies, M. (1997). “Externalism and Experience.” In The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Gertler, Brie. (2007a). “Overextending the Mind” In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge: 192-206.

  • _____. (2007b). “Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.” Philosophical Issues 17 (1): 37–56.

  • _____. (2012). “Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?” Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 51-75.

  • Lau, Joe, and Duetsch, Max. () “Externalism about Mental Content,” available here at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Pautz, A., 2007. ‘Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence’, in J. Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 21, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • –––, 2010. ‘Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?’, in B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    –––, forthcoming. ‘The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists’, in R. Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Putnam, Hilary. () “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.” pp. 581-596.

Causal Theory of Content    

  • Adams, F. (2003). “Thoughts and their Contents: Naturalized Semantics.” In S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 143–171.

  • Adams, Fred, Aizawa, Ken. (2010). “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entrie s/content-causal/>.

  • Baker, L. (1989). “On a Causal Theory of Content.” Philosophical Perspectives 3: 165–186.

  • Baker, L., 1991, “Has Content Been Naturalized?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 17–32.

  • Boghossian, P., 1991, “Naturalizing Content,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 65–86.

  • Dretske, Fred. (2002). “A Recipe for Thought.” In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Fodor, J., 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford.

  • Fodor, J., 1990a, A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press.

  • Lloyd, D., 1987, “Mental Representation from the Bottom up,” Synthese, 70: 23–78.

  • Lloyd, D., 1989, Simple minds, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

  • Loar, B., 1991, “Can We Explain Intentionality?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 119–135.

  • Loewer, B., 1987, “From Information to Intentionality,” Synthese, 70: 287–317.

  • Maloney, C., 1990, “Mental Representation,” Philosophy of Science, 57: 445–458.

  • Maloney, J., 1994, “Content: Covariation, Control and Contingency,” Synthese, 100: 241–290.

  • Stampe, D., 1975, “Show and Tell,” in B. Freed, A. Marras, and P. Maynard (eds.), Forms of Representation, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 221-245.

  • Stampe, D., 1977, “Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,” in P. French, H. K. Wettstein, and T. E. Uehling (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 42–63.

  • Stampe, D., 1986, “Verification and a Causal Account of Meaning,” Synthese 69: 107–137.

  • Stampe, D., 1990, “Content, Context, and Explanation,” in E. Villanueva, Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 134–152.

 

Representational Accounts of Consciousness    

  • Dretske, Fred. (1993). “Conscious Experience.” Mind 102 (406): 263-283. 

  • _____. (1995. Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.

  • _____. (2003. ‘How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?’, in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access and First Person Authority, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

  • Fodor, J.A., 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell.

  • Gray, R., 2003. ‘Tye’s Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?’, Philosophical Studies, 115: 245-56.

  • Kriegel, U., 2002a. ‘PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness’, Philosophical Psychology, 15: 55-64.

  • _____. 2002b. ‘Phenomenal Content’, Erkenntnis, 57: 175-98.

  • Lycan, W.G., 1987. Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.

  • –––, 1998. ‘In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia’ (Replies to Neander, Rey and Tye), in Tomberlin (1998).

  • ––– (ed.), 1999. Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  • –––, 2001. ‘The Case for Phenomenal Externalism’, in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 15), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing.

  • Lycan, William. (2015). “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/ consciousness-representational/>.

  • Papineau, D., 2002. Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2007. ‘Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts’, in Alter and Walter (2007).

  • Peacocke, C., 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2008. ‘Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 62: 7-24.

  • Perry, J., 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Pitcher, G., 1970. ‘Pain Perception’, Philosophical Review, 79: 368-93.

  • Prinz, J., 2007. ‘Mental Pointing’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14: 184-211.

  • Putnam, H., 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Rosenthal, David. (2002). “Explaining Consciousness.” In David J. Chalmers (ed.). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 109-131.

  • Tye, Michael. (2002). “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.” Noûs 36: 137-51.

Challenges to Reductionism

Against Representational Theories of Consciousness    

  • Horgan, Terence, and Tienson, John. (2002). “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 520--533.

  • Lycan, William. (2008). “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). see especially section 4.

  • Pautz, Adam. (2007). “Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.” In J. Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 21. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • _____. (2010). “Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?” In B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • _____. (2013). “The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists.” In R. Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Against Causal Theories of Content    

  • Buras, Todd. (2009). “An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.” American Philosophical Quarterly 46: 117-131. 

  • Cummins, Robert C. (1997). “The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content.” Journal of Philosophy 94 (10): 535-542.

 

The Multiple-Realizability Argument    

  • Antony, Louise M. (1999). “Multiple Realizability, Projectibility and the Reality of Mental Properties.” Philosophical Topics 26: 1-24.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1974). “Special Sciences (Or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese 28 (2): 97-115. 

  • Gillett, Carl. (2003). “The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences.” Journal of Philosophy 100: 591-603

  • Jaworski, William. (2002). “Multiple-Realizability, Explanation, and the Disjunctive Move.” Philosophical Studies 108: 298-308.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1992). “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1-26. 

  • Kim, Sungsu. (2002). “Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale.” Philosophy of Science 69: 606-610.

  • Lewis, David. (1980). “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” In Block 1980a, 216-222.

  • Putnam, Hilary. (1960). “Minds and Machines.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975, 362-385.

  • _____. (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.

  • Shapiro, Lawrence. (2000). “Multiple Realizations.” Journal of Philosophy 97: 635-654.

  • Sober, Elliott. (1999). “The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism.” Philosophy of Science 66: 542-564.

  • Witmer, Gene. (2003). “Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim’s Challenge.” In Physicalism and Mental Causation, S. Walter and H. Heckmann, eds. Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 59-84.

 

The Chinese Room Argument    

  • Block, Ned. (2002). “Searle's Arguments Against Cognitive Science.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002.

  • Cam, P., 1990, ‘Searle on Strong AI’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 103–8.

  • Chalmers, David. (1992). “Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room.” in J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

  • _____. (1996). “Minds, machines, and mathematics.” Psyche 2: 11–20.

  • Churchland, P. and Churchland, P. (1990). “Could a machine think?” Scientific American 262(1): 32–37.

  • Cole, David. (1991a). “Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity.” Synthese 88: 399–417.

  • _____. (1991b). “Artificial Minds: Cam on Searle.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69: 329–33.

  • _____. (2015). “The Chinese Room Argument.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/chinese-room/>.

  • Copeland, J. (2002). “The Chinese Room from a Logical Point of View.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 104–122.

  • Crane, Tim. (1996) The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation. London: Penguin.

  • Double, R. (1983). “Searle, Programs and Functionalism.” Nature and System 5: 107–14.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1991). “Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room.” In D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Harnad, S. (1989). “Minds, Machines and Searle.” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence. 1: 5–25.

  • _____. (2002) “Minds, Machines, and Searle2: What's Right and Wrong about the Chinese Room Argument.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 294–307.

  • Hauser, L. (1997). “Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument.” Minds and Machines. 7: 199–226.

  • _____. (2002). “‘Nixin’ Goes to China.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 123–143.

  • Kaernbach, C. (2005). “No Virtual Mind in the Chinese Room.” Journal of Consciousness Studies. 12(11): 31–42.

  • Nute, D. (2011) “A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids.” Minds and Machines 21: 431–3.

  • Penrose, R. (2002). “Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 226–249.

  • Preston, J. and M. Bishop (eds.). (2002) Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Rey, G., 1986, ‘What's Really Going on in Searle's ”Chinese Room“’, Philosophical Studies, 50: 169–85.

  • _____. (2002). “Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI.” in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 201–225.

  • Searle, John. (1980). “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–57. 

  • _____. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • _____. (1989). “Artificial Intelligence and the Chinese Room: An Exchange.” New York Review of Books 36: 2 (February 16, 1989).

  • _____. (1990). “Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?” Scientific American 262(1): 26–31.

  • _____. (1999). “The Chinese Room.” In R.A. Wilson and F. Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (2002). “Twenty-one Years in the Chinese Room.” In Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002: 51–69.

  • Shaffer, M. (2009) “A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room.” Minds and Machines 19(2): 229–235.

  • Sprevak, M. (2007). “Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58(4): 755–776.

  • Turing, Alan. (1948). “Intelligent Machinery: A Report.” London: National Physical Laboratory.

  • _____. (1950). ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Mind, 59: 433–460.

  • Weiss, T. (1990). “Closing the Chinese Room.” Ratio 3: 165–81.

 

An Argument from the Unity of Consciousness    

For a more exhaustive list, see the Argument from Reason Archive (here).

  • Butler, Joseph. (1736) The Analogy of Religion. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Clark, Samuel. (1738)  “Four Defenses of a Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” In The Works of Samuel Clarke. London: James, John, and Paul Knapton.

  • Hasker, William. (1999) The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 122-146. 

  • _____. (2009) “Persons and the Unity of Consciousness.” In The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Edited by Robert C. Koons & George Bealer. Oxford University Press, 175-190.

  • Mijuskovic, Ben Lazare, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

  • Shrader, Warner. (2006) “The Unity of Consciousness: Trouble for the Materialist or the Emergent Dualist?” Faith & Philosophy. Vol. 23, No. 1: 33-44.

 

An Argument from Reason    

For a more exhaustive list, see the Argument from Reason Archive (here)

  • Buras, Todd. (2014). “On the Failures of Naturalism.” Review and Expositor 111 (3): 259-73.Drange, Theodore. (2003). “Several Unsuccessful Formulations of the Argument From Reason: A Response to Victor Reppert.” Philosophia Christi 5 (1): 35-52.

  • Hasker, William. (1999). The Emergent Self. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. See pages 58-80.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1993). “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion.” In Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. See pages 237-265.

  • Malcolm, Norman. (1968). “The Conceivability of Mechanism.” Philosophical Review 77: 45-72. 

  • Parsons, Keith M. (2000). “Further Reflections on the Argument from Reason.” Philo 3 (1) (Summer-Spring): 90-102. 

  • Reppert, Victor. (1999). “The Argument from Reason.” Philo 2 (1) (Spring-Summer): 33-45. 

  • _____. (2000). “Reply to Parsons and Lippard on the Argument from Reason” Philo 3 (1) (Spring-Summer): 76-89. 

  • _____. (2003). “Several Formulations of the Argument from Reason.” Philosophia Christi 5 (1): 1-9.

  • van Inwagen, Peter. (2013). “C. S. Lewis's Argument Against Naturalism.” Res Philosophica 90 (1): 113-124.

 

Conceivability Arguments (Qualia Inversion)    

  • Block, Ned. (1980). “Troubles with Functionalism.” In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, N. Block (ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • –––, 1990, “Inverted Earth”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 53–79.

  • Brenner, W. H., 2015, “From Inverted Spectra to Colorless Qualia: A Wittgensteinian Critique”, Philosophical Investigations, 38(4): 360–381.

  • Broackes, J., 2007, “Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 161–75.

  • Byrne, Alex. (2002) “Something About Mary”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 63: 123–40.

  • _____. (2016). “Inverted Qualia.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/qualia-inverted/>.

  • Campbell, N., 2000, “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States”, Synthese, 124: 239–55.

  • Canfield, J., 2001, “Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophia, 37: 691–712.

  • Chalmers, D., 1995, “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”, in Conscious Experience, T. Metzinger (ed.), Ferdinand-Schoningh: Paderborn.

  • Churchland, P. M., and Churchland, P. S., 1981, “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality”, Philosophical Topics, 12: 121–46.

  • Cole, D. J., 1990, “Functionalism and Inverted Spectra”, Synthese, 82: 207–22.

  • Hilbert, D. R., and Kalderon, M., 2000, “Color and the Inverted Spectrum”, in Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives, S. Davis (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Horgan, T., 1984, “Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 453–70.

  • Johnsen, B. C., 1986, “The Inverted Spectrum”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 471–6.

  • –––, 1993, “The Intelligibility of Spectrum Inversion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 631–6.

  • Kirk, R., 1982, “Goodbye to Transposed Qualia”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 82: 33–44.

  • Levine, J., 1983, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354–61.

  • –––, 1988, “Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited”, Mind and Language, 3: 271–87.

  • –––, 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Lycan, W. G., 1973, “Inverted Spectrum”, Ratio, 15: 315–9.

  • –––, 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Macpherson, F., 2005, “Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 127–52.

  • Marcus, E., 2006, “Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 321–39.

  • McGinn, C., 1983, The Subjective View, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 1989, Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Myin, E., 2001, “Color and the Duplication Assumption”, Synthese, 129: 61–77.

  • Nida-Rümelin, M., 1996, “Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?”, Philosophical Studies, 82: 145–57. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.

  • Putnam, H., 1967, “Psychological Predicates”, in Art, Mind and Religion, W. Capitan and D. Merrill (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted as “The Nature of Mental States” in Putnam, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • –––, 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, K. Gunderson (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Putnam, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Schoettle, T., 2009, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Inverted Spectrum”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 98–115.

  • Shoemaker, S., 1975a, “Functionalism and Qualia”, Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984.

  • –––, 1981, “Absent Qualia Are Impossible”, Philosophical Review, 90: 581–99. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984.

  • –––, 1982, “The Inverted Spectrum”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 357–81; page reference is to the reprint in Shoemaker 1984.

  • Speaks, J., 2011, “Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible”, Philosophical Studies, 156: 339–61.

  • Stalnaker, R. (1999). “Comparing Qualia Across Persons”, Philosophical Topics, 26: 385–405; page reference is to the reprint in Stalnaker, 2003, Ways a World Might Be, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2006, ‘Reply to Shoemaker’, in Content and Modality, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Strawson, G., 1989, “Red and ‘Red’”, Synthese, 78: 193–232.

  • –––, 1994, Mental Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Thompson, B., 2008, “Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra”, Synthese, 160: 203–13.

  • Tye, M., 1994, “Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum”, Noûs, 28: 159–183.

  • –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • –––, 2002, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited”, in Philosophy of Mind, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2003, “Qualia”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/qualia/>.

 

More Conceivability Arguments (Zombies)    
Bailey, Andrew R. (2009). “Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.” Dialogue 48: 129-44.
Balog, K. (1999). “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Review 108: 497–528.
_____. (2012). “In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 1-23.
Block, Ned. (2002). “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Philosophy 99: 391–425.
Chalmers, David. (1995). “Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 200-219. 
_____. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
_____. (1999). “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 475–496.
Chalmers, David, and Jackson, Frank. (2001). “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.” Philosophical Review 110: 315–61.
Crane, Tim. (2005). “Papineau on Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 155–62 .
Flanagan, O., and T. Polger. (1995). “Zombies and the Function of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 313–321.
Frankish, K. (2007)” ‘The Anti-Zombie Argument.” Philosophical Quarterly 57: 650–666 .
Harnad, S. (1995). “Why and How We Are Not Zombies.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 1: 164–167.
Hill, C. S. (1997). “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Studies 87: 61–85.
Kirk, Robert. (1974). “Zombies v. Materialists.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (Supplementary): 135–152.
_____. (2005). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_____. (2008). “The Inconceivability of Zombies.” Philosophical Studies 139: 73–89.
_____. (2013). The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirk, Robert. (2015) “Zombies.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/zombies/>.
Kripke, Saul. (1980) “Naming and Necessity.” Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levine, Joseph. (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Loar, B. (1999). “David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 465–472.
Lyons, J. C., (2009). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marcus, E. (2004). “Why Zombies are Inconceivable.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 477–90.
Marton, P. (1998). ‘”Zombies vs. Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability.” Southwest Philosophy Review 14: 131–38.
Shear, Jonathan. (ed), (1997). Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press.
Shoemaker, S., 1975, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315.
_____. (1981, ‘Absent Qualia are Impossible’, Philosophical Review, 90: 581–599.
_____. (1999, ‘On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 439–444.
Stalnaker, R., 2002, ‘What is it Like to Be a Zombie?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002.
Stoljar, Daniel. (2001). ‘The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 15, James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 393–413.
_____. (2005, ‘Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind and Language, 20: 469–94.
_____. (2006, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
_____. (2007, ‘Two Conceivability Arguments Compared’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108: 27–44.
Tye, Michael. (1995), Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
_____. (2006). “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Review 115: 139–68.
_____. (2008). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Webster, W. R. (2006). “Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible.” Synthese 151: 297–310.
Worley, D., 2003, ‘Conceivability, Possibility, and Physicalism’, Analysis, 63: 15–23.
Yablo, Stephen. (1993) “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 1–42.

 

The Knowledge Argument    
Fumerton, Richard. (2013). Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Gertler, Brie. (1999). “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.” Philosophical Studies 93 (3): 317-336.
Jackson, Frank. (1982).“Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–36.
_____. (1986). “What Mary Didn’t Know.” Journal of Philosophy 83: 291–95.
Moreland, J. P. (2003). “The Knowledge Argument Revisited.” International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2) (170): 219-28.
Nagel, Thomas. (1974). “What is it like to be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83: 435–50.
Nagasawa, Yujin. (2010). “The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism.” Erkenntnis (72): 37–56.
Nida-Rumelin, Martine. (). “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument,” avaialble here at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasaqa, and Daniel Stoljar, (eds.) (2004). There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
Walton, M. (1989). “The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument.” Analysis 49: 158–160.

 

The Explanatory Gap Argument    
Chalmers, David. (2007). “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.” In T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press: 167–94.
Foster, John. (1996). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. London: Routledge. See chapter 5.
Gertler, Brie. (2001). “The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion: A Reply to Michael Tye.” Mind 110 (439): 689-694.
Levine, Joseph. (1983). “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 354-61.
Robinson, Howard. (1982). Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1): 5-19.
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2009). “The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism.” Faith & Philosophy 26 (5): 514-26.

 

Materialist Responses    

  • Block, Ned and Stalnaker, Robert. (1999). “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” Philosophical Review 108 (1): 1-46.

  • Chalmers, David. (2003). “Consciousness and its Place in Nature.” In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 102--142.

  • Churchland, Paul. (1995). The Engine of Reason and Seat of the Soul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Dennett, Daniel. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 

  • Hill, Christopher. (1997). “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.

  • Lewis, David. (1990). “What Experience Teaches.” In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell: 29-57.

  • Searle, John. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 

Main Alternatives to Reductionism

Non-Reductive Materialism    

  • Melnyk, Andrew. (2008). “Can Physicalism be Non-Reductive?” Philosophy Compass: 1281-1296. 

  • Pereboom, Derek. (2002). “Robust Nonreductive Materialism.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 499-531. 

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1989) “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3): 31-47. 

  • Davidson, Donald. (1970). “Mental Events.” In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press 79-101.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1974). “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese 28 (2): 97-115.

  • Schneider, Susan. (2013). “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem.” Noûs 47 (1): 135-153.

 

 

Eliminativism    

  • Churchland, Paul M. (1981). “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90.

  • _____. (1988). Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1993). “Evaluating Our Self Conception.” Mind and Language 8 (2): 211–222.

  • Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1994). “Can Neurobiology Teach us Anything about Consciousness?” Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4): 23–40.

  • Cling, A. (1989). “Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistenc,” Philosophical Studies 56: 53–75.

  • Conman, J. (1968). “On the Elimination of Sensations and Sensations.” Review of Metaphysics XXII: 15–35.

  • Dennett, Daniel. (1978). “Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain” Brainstorms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 190–229.

  • _____. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1988). “Quining Qualia.” In A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 42-77.

  • _____. (1991). “Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Versus Folk Science, and Belief Versus Opinion,” in: Greenwood, J. (ed), The Future of Folk Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Feyerabend, P. (1963). “Mental Events and the Brain.” Journal of Philosophy 40: 295–6.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Forster, M. and Saidel, E. (1994). “Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Psychology 7: 437–452.

  • Haldane, John. (1988). “Understanding Folk.” Aristotelian Society Supplement 62: 222–46.

  • Hannan, B., 1993, “Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.” Mind and Language 8(2): 165–179.

  • Hardcastle, V. (1999). The Myth of Pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Lewis, David. (1972). “Psychological and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3): 207–15.

  • Lycan, William, and Pappas, G. (1972). “What Is Eliminative Materialism?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149–59.

  • Reppert, Victor. (1992). “Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question.” Metaphilosophy 23: 378–92.

  • Rey, G. (1983). “A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.” In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol. 3. New York, Plenum: 1–39.

  • _____. (1988). “A Question About Consciousness.” In H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds), Perspectives on Mind. Dorderecht: Reidel, 5–24.

  • Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1991). “Do True Believers Exist?” Aristotelian Society Supplement 65: 229–44.

  • _____. (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Wilkes, K. (1993). “The Relationship Between Scientific and Common Sense Psychology.” In Christensen, S. and Turner, D. (eds), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum:144–187.

  • _____. (1995). “Losing Consciousness.” In Metzinger, T. (ed.), Consciousness and Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    Rorty, R. (1970). In Defense of Eliminative Materialism, Review of Metaphysics 24: 112–121.

 

Intentionalism    

  • Dennett, Daniel. (1981). “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.” In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 150-167.

  • Byrne, Alex. (2001). “Intentionalism Defended.” Philosophical Review 110 (2): 199-240.

 

Mysterianism    

  • De Caro, Mario. (2009). “Mysterianism and Skepticism.” Iris 1 (2): 449-458.

  • Kriegel, Uriah. (2004). “The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica 18 (30-31): 177-191.

  • McGinn, Colin. (1989). “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind 98 (July): 349-66.

  • _____.(1991). The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • _____. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York, NY: Basic Books.

  • Nagel, Thomas. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

  • Rowlands, Mark. (2007). “Mysterianism.” In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell: 335--345.

 

Panpsychism        

  • Broad, C. (1925). The Mind and Its Place in Nature. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

  • Clark, D. (2004). Panpsychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  • Kim, J. (1999). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books.

  • Nagel, T. (1979). “Panpsychism” in Nagel's Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • _____. (1999). “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy 73 (285): 337-352.

  • _____. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Seager, William, and Allen-Hermanson, Sean. (2015). "Panpsychism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entrie s/panpsychism/>.

  • Skrbina, D. (2005). Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Skrbina, D. (ed). (2009). Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

  • Strawson, G. (1997). “The Self.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5/6): 405-28. 

  • –––. (2006). “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13. 

  • Tye, Michael. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Epiphenomenalism    

  • Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (2005). Physicalism or Something Near Enough. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

  • _____. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Robinson, William. (2015) “Epiphenomenalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/epiphenomenalism/>.

  • Shapiro, L. A., and Sober, E. (2007). “Epiphenomenalism: The Do's and the Don'ts.” In G. Wolters and P. Machamer, eds., Thinking About Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

  • Swinburne, Richard. (2011). “Could anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism?” The Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3–4): 196–216.

 

Dualism    

  • See The Dualism Archive (Here)

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