Consciousness and Fundamental Fine-Tuning

Basic Idea

Fine-tuning debates about the existence of God have overlooked non-theistic personal explanations rooted in philosophy of mind. Philip Goff’s agentive cosmopsychism proposes a conscious universe that fine-tunes itself. Drawing on Brentano’s teleological insights, I argue this view cannot explain fundamental fine-tuning—the ontological conditions enabling fine-tuning itself. This gap strengthens the case for theism by raising the prior probability of teleology.

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Abstract

The state of fine-tuning debates has overlooked non-theistic personal explanations. Some underexplored accounts appeal to resources in the philosophy of mind, such as a consciousness-first ontology, like panpsychism. Philip Goff defends such a hypothesis (agentive cosmopsychism): anthropic fine-­tuning is best explained by a conscious universe capable of fine-­ tuning itself. Drawing from Franz Brentano’s neglected teleological argument, I argue that agentive cosmopsychism, although helpful in moving the fine-tuning debates forward, fails insofar as it cannot explain what I call fundamental fine-tuning: the precise ontological features necessary for the act of fine-tuning. In conclusion, I explain how fundamental fine-tuning impacts teleological arguments in general by positively altering the prior probability of teleology on theism.