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The Philosophy
of Mind Archive

General Works

Reductionism

​Physicalism in General

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge.

  • Crane, Tim. and Mellor, D.H. (1990). “There is No Question of Physicalism.” Mind 99: 185–206.

  • Davidson, Donald. (1970). “Mental Events.” in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207–223.

  • Dowell, J.L. (2006). “Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 131(1): 1–23.

  • Gillet, C. and Loewer, B. (2001). Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Hawthorne, John. (2002). “Blocking Definitions of Materialism.” Philosophical Studies 110(2): 103–113.

  • Jackson, Frank. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1993). Mind and Supervenience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1998). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (2005). Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Lewis, David. (1994). “Reduction of Mind.” In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell: 412–431.

  • Melnyk A. (1997). “How To Keep The ‘Physical’.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 622–637.

  • _____. (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Montero, B. and Papineau, D. (2005). “A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism.” Analysis 65 (3): 233–237.

  • Neurath, O. (1931). “Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Vienna Circle.” In R.S. Cohen, and M. Neurath (eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983: 48–51.

  • Ney, A. (2008). “Physicalism as an Attitude” Philosophical Studies 138: 1–15.

  • Papineau, David. (1996). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • _____. (2002). Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See chapter 2 and the appendix.

  • Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Routledge.

  • Smart, J.J.C., (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Reprinted in D. Rosenthal (ed.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.

  • _____. (1978). “The Content of Physicalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 28: 239–41.

  • Stoljar, Daniel. (2000). “Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori.” Journal of Philosophy 97 (1): 33–54.

  • _____. (2001). “Two Conceptions of the Physical.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 253–281.

  • _____. (2010). Physicalism. New York: Routledge.

  • _____. (2015). “Physicalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/physicalism/>.

  • Stroud, B. (1986). “The Physical World.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 263–277.

  • Van Cleve, James. (1990). “Supervenience and Closure.” Philosophical Studies 58: 225–283.

  • Wilson, J. (1999). “How Superduper does a Phyisicalist Supervenience need to be?” Philosophical Quarterly 49: 33–52.

  • _____. (2005). “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism.” Nous 39:3: 426–459.

  • _____. (2006). “On Characterizing the Physical.” Philosophical Studies 131: 61–99.

  • Yolton, R. (1983). Thinking Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 

The Structure of Physicalism    

  • Oppenheim, Paul, and Putnam, Hillary. (1958). “The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” In Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds.). University of Minnesota Press. 

  • Kim, J. (1998). Reduction, problems of. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge, URL <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/reduction-problems-of/v-1/>

  • Horgan, Terence. (1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind 102 (408): 555-86.

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Functionalist Reductionism    

  • Armstrong, David. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.

  • _____. (1981). The Nature of Mind. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

  • _____. (1993). “Causes are Perceived and Introspected.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(1): 29–29.

  • Block, Ned. (1980). “Troubles With Functionalism.” In Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 268–305.

  • Churchland, Paul. (2005). “Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 33–50.

  • Davidson, Donald. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne (eds.). (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Horgan, T. and J. Tienson. (2002). “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Chalmers,

  • David. (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mind. New York. Oxford University Press, 520–533.

  • Levin, J. (1985). “Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (Supplement): 85–104.

  • _____. (1986). “Could Love be Like a Heatwave?” Philosophical Studies 49: 245–261.

  • _____. (1998). “Must Reasons be Rational?” Philosophy of Science 55: 199–217.

  • _____. (2013). “Functionalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = \<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/functionalism/>.

  • Lewis, D. (1972. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, in Block 1980, 207–215.

  • _____. (1980). “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” In Block 1980: 216–222.

  • Malcolm, N. (1968). “The Conceivability of Mechanism.” Philosophical Review 77: 45–72.

  • McCullagh, M. (2000). “Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.” Mind and Language 15(5): 481–499.

  • McDowell, J. (1985). “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism.” In E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 387–398.

  • McLaughlin, B. (2006). “Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenaliam?” Consciousness Studies 13 (1–2): 39–66.

  • Piccinini, G. (2004). “Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental States.” Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35: 811–833.

  • Place, U.T., 1956. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology 47: 44–50.

  • Putnam, H., 1960. “Minds and Machines.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 362–385.

  • _____. (1963). “Brains and Behavior.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 325–341.

  • _____. (1975a). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Reprinted in Putnam 1975b: 215–271.

  • _____. (1975b). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Rupert, R. (2006). “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessitated Effects.” Noûs 40: 256–283.

  • Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutcheson.

  • Schaffer, J. (2003). “Overdetermining Causes.” Philosophical Studies 114: 23–45.

  • Searle, John. (1980). “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–457

  • _____. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Shagrir, O, (2005). “The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism.” In Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 220–250

  • Shoemaker, Sydney. (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1984a). “Functionalism and Qualia.” In Shoemaker 1984: 184–205.

  • _____. (1984b). “Some varieties of functionalism.” In Shoemaker 1984: 261–286.

  • _____. (2001). “Realization and Mental Causation.” In C. Gillet and B. Loewer, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–98.

  • Smart, J.J.C, (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Philosophical Review 68: 141–156.

  • Sprevak, M. (2009). “Extended cognition and functionalism.” Journal of Philosophy 106(9): 503–527.

  • Stalnaker, Robert. (2002). “What is it Like to Be a Zombie?” In Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 385–400.

  • Tooley, M. (2001). “Functional Concepts, Referentially Opaque Contexts, Causal Relations, and the Definition of Theoretical Terms.” Philosophical Studies 105(3): 251–279.

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Content Externalism    

  • Davies, M. (1997). “Externalism and Experience.” In The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Gertler, Brie. (2007a). “Overextending the Mind” In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge: 192-206.

  • _____. (2007b). “Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.” Philosophical Issues 17 (1): 37–56.

  • _____. (2012). “Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?” Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 51-75.

  • Lau, Joe, and Duetsch, Max. () “Externalism about Mental Content,” available here at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Pautz, A., 2007. ‘Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence’, in J. Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 21, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

  • –––, 2010. ‘Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?’, in B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    –––, forthcoming. ‘The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists’, in R. Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Putnam, Hilary. () “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.” pp. 581-596.

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Causal Theory of Content    

  • Adams, F. (2003). “Thoughts and their Contents: Naturalized Semantics.” In S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 143–171.

  • Adams, Fred, Aizawa, Ken. (2010). “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entrie s/content-causal/>.

  • Baker, L. (1989). “On a Causal Theory of Content.” Philosophical Perspectives 3: 165–186.

  • Baker, L., 1991, “Has Content Been Naturalized?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 17–32.

  • Boghossian, P., 1991, “Naturalizing Content,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 65–86.

  • Dretske, Fred. (2002). “A Recipe for Thought.” In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Fodor, J., 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford.

  • Fodor, J., 1990a, A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press.

  • Lloyd, D., 1987, “Mental Representation from the Bottom up,” Synthese, 70: 23–78.

  • Lloyd, D., 1989, Simple minds, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

  • Loar, B., 1991, “Can We Explain Intentionality?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 119–135.

  • Loewer, B., 1987, “From Information to Intentionality,” Synthese, 70: 287–317.

  • Maloney, C., 1990, “Mental Representation,” Philosophy of Science, 57: 445–458.

  • Maloney, J., 1994, “Content: Covariation, Control and Contingency,” Synthese, 100: 241–290.

  • Stampe, D., 1975, “Show and Tell,” in B. Freed, A. Marras, and P. Maynard (eds.), Forms of Representation, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 221-245.

  • Stampe, D., 1977, “Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,” in P. French, H. K. Wettstein, and T. E. Uehling (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 42–63.

  • Stampe, D., 1986, “Verification and a Causal Account of Meaning,” Synthese 69: 107–137.

  • Stampe, D., 1990, “Content, Context, and Explanation,” in E. Villanueva, Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 134–152.

 

Representational Accounts of Consciousness    

  • Dretske, Fred. (1993). “Conscious Experience.” Mind 102 (406): 263-283. 

  • _____. (1995. Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.

  • _____. (2003. ‘How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?’, in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access and First Person Authority, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

  • Fodor, J.A., 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell.

  • Gray, R., 2003. ‘Tye’s Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?’, Philosophical Studies, 115: 245-56.

  • Kriegel, U., 2002a. ‘PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness’, Philosophical Psychology, 15: 55-64.

  • _____. 2002b. ‘Phenomenal Content’, Erkenntnis, 57: 175-98.

  • Lycan, W.G., 1987. Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.

  • –––, 1998. ‘In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia’ (Replies to Neander, Rey and Tye), in Tomberlin (1998).

  • ––– (ed.), 1999. Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  • –––, 2001. ‘The Case for Phenomenal Externalism’, in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 15), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing.

  • Lycan, William. (2015). “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/ consciousness-representational/>.

  • Papineau, D., 2002. Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2007. ‘Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts’, in Alter and Walter (2007).

  • Peacocke, C., 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • –––, 2008. ‘Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 62: 7-24.

  • Perry, J., 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Pitcher, G., 1970. ‘Pain Perception’, Philosophical Review, 79: 368-93.

  • Prinz, J., 2007. ‘Mental Pointing’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14: 184-211.

  • Putnam, H., 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Rosenthal, David. (2002). “Explaining Consciousness.” In David J. Chalmers (ed.). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 109-131.

  • Tye, Michael. (2002). “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.” Noûs 36: 137-51.

Challenges
to Reductionism

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Main Alternatives to Reductionism

Non-Reductive Materialism    

  • Melnyk, Andrew. (2008). “Can Physicalism be Non-Reductive?” Philosophy Compass: 1281-1296. 

  • Pereboom, Derek. (2002). “Robust Nonreductive Materialism.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 499-531. 

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (1989) “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3): 31-47. 

  • Davidson, Donald. (1970). “Mental Events.” In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press 79-101.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1974). “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese 28 (2): 97-115.

  • Schneider, Susan. (2013). “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem.” Noûs 47 (1): 135-153.

 

 

Eliminativism    

  • Churchland, Paul M. (1981). “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90.

  • _____. (1988). Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1993). “Evaluating Our Self Conception.” Mind and Language 8 (2): 211–222.

  • Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1994). “Can Neurobiology Teach us Anything about Consciousness?” Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4): 23–40.

  • Cling, A. (1989). “Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistenc,” Philosophical Studies 56: 53–75.

  • Conman, J. (1968). “On the Elimination of Sensations and Sensations.” Review of Metaphysics XXII: 15–35.

  • Dennett, Daniel. (1978). “Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain” Brainstorms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 190–229.

  • _____. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1988). “Quining Qualia.” In A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 42-77.

  • _____. (1991). “Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Versus Folk Science, and Belief Versus Opinion,” in: Greenwood, J. (ed), The Future of Folk Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Feyerabend, P. (1963). “Mental Events and the Brain.” Journal of Philosophy 40: 295–6.

  • Fodor, Jerry. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Forster, M. and Saidel, E. (1994). “Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Psychology 7: 437–452.

  • Haldane, John. (1988). “Understanding Folk.” Aristotelian Society Supplement 62: 222–46.

  • Hannan, B., 1993, “Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.” Mind and Language 8(2): 165–179.

  • Hardcastle, V. (1999). The Myth of Pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Lewis, David. (1972). “Psychological and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3): 207–15.

  • Lycan, William, and Pappas, G. (1972). “What Is Eliminative Materialism?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149–59.

  • Reppert, Victor. (1992). “Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question.” Metaphilosophy 23: 378–92.

  • Rey, G. (1983). “A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.” In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol. 3. New York, Plenum: 1–39.

  • _____. (1988). “A Question About Consciousness.” In H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds), Perspectives on Mind. Dorderecht: Reidel, 5–24.

  • Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • _____. (1991). “Do True Believers Exist?” Aristotelian Society Supplement 65: 229–44.

  • _____. (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Wilkes, K. (1993). “The Relationship Between Scientific and Common Sense Psychology.” In Christensen, S. and Turner, D. (eds), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum:144–187.

  • _____. (1995). “Losing Consciousness.” In Metzinger, T. (ed.), Consciousness and Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    Rorty, R. (1970). In Defense of Eliminative Materialism, Review of Metaphysics 24: 112–121.

 

Intentionalism    

  • Dennett, Daniel. (1981). “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.” In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 150-167.

  • Byrne, Alex. (2001). “Intentionalism Defended.” Philosophical Review 110 (2): 199-240.

 

Mysterianism    

  • De Caro, Mario. (2009). “Mysterianism and Skepticism.” Iris 1 (2): 449-458.

  • Kriegel, Uriah. (2004). “The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica 18 (30-31): 177-191.

  • McGinn, Colin. (1989). “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind 98 (July): 349-66.

  • _____.(1991). The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • _____. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York, NY: Basic Books.

  • Nagel, Thomas. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

  • Rowlands, Mark. (2007). “Mysterianism.” In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell: 335--345.

 

Panpsychism        

  • Broad, C. (1925). The Mind and Its Place in Nature. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

  • Clark, D. (2004). Panpsychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  • Kim, J. (1999). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books.

  • Nagel, T. (1979). “Panpsychism” in Nagel's Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • _____. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • _____. (1999). “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy 73 (285): 337-352.

  • _____. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Seager, William, and Allen-Hermanson, Sean. (2015). "Panpsychism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entrie s/panpsychism/>.

  • Skrbina, D. (2005). Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Skrbina, D. (ed). (2009). Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

  • Strawson, G. (1997). “The Self.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5/6): 405-28. 

  • –––. (2006). “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13. 

  • Tye, Michael. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Epiphenomenalism    

  • Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Kim, Jaegwon. (2005). Physicalism or Something Near Enough. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

  • _____. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Robinson, William. (2015) “Epiphenomenalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/epiphenomenalism/>.

  • Shapiro, L. A., and Sober, E. (2007). “Epiphenomenalism: The Do's and the Don'ts.” In G. Wolters and P. Machamer, eds., Thinking About Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

  • Swinburne, Richard. (2011). “Could anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism?” The Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3–4): 196–216.

 

Dualism    

  • See The Soul Archive (Here)

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